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Albania: Text of Electoral Law

AU0804154696 Tirana REPUBLIKA (supplement) in Albanian 31 Mar 96 pp 1-4

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Articles 16 and 17 of the Law on the Main Constitutional Dispositions No. 7,491 of 29 April 1991 and on the proposal of the parliamentary group of the Democratic Party, the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania has decreed as follows:

Chapter I

General Provisions

Article 1. Elections for deputies to the People's Assembly are held by universal, direct, free, and secret ballot on the territory of the Republic of Albania.

Article 2. All Albanian citizens who are 18 years old on the day of the elections have the right to vote.

All those who are 18 years old on the day of the elections, are Albanian citizens, have been permanently resident in the Republic of Albania for no less than six months, and who meet the provisions of the Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Committed for Political, Ideological, and Religious Motives under Communist Rule in Albania, No. 8,001 of 22 September 1995 and the Law on Screening Officials and Other Persons Involved in Protecting the Democratic State, No. 8,043 of 30 November 1995, have the right to be elected as deputies to the People's Assembly.

Article 3. Citizens whose electoral rights have been removed by a verdict of a court because they have committed a crime or are considered mentally incapable by the court are deprived of their electoral rights.

Article 4. Electoral rights are exercised on the basis of the electoral register.

Voters take part in the voting at the polling station on whose lists their names are registered.

A voter exercises his right to vote in person and only once, by casting his vote for one candidate standing in a single-member constituency, and for only one of the electoral subjects to whom additional mandates are to be allocated nationwide.

Article 5. A deputy of the People's Assembly cannot at the same time be an elected or appointed member of the local authorities of the state administration or of the organs of justice.

Chapter II

Electoral System

Article 6. The People's Assembly consists of 140 deputies, of whom 115 are elected directly in single-member constituencies, and of whom 25 hold additional mandates given to candidates on the lists of electoral subjects nationwide on the basis of votes gained in the first round, according to the rule defined in Article 11.

Article 7. A candidate who wins more than one-half of all the valid votes in a given constituency is considered as having been elected as a People's Assembly deputy for a single-member constituency.

Article 8. If no candidate wins more than 50 percent of the valid votes in the first round of elections, a second round of elections is held in the relevant constituency one week later.

The two candidates who have won the most votes in the first round appear as candidates for the post of deputy in the second round of elections.

If three or more candidates win equal numbers of votes in the first round, the two candidates to take part in the second round are chosen by lot; if one candidate has won the largest number of votes and after him two or more candidates have won equal numbers of votes in the first round, the second candidate is chosen by lot.

If an electoral subject withdraws its candidate from the second round, the candidate who has gained the largest percentage of votes among the other candidates in the first round takes his place.

The constituency electoral commission declares the candidates for the second round.

Article 9. The candidate who has won the largest number of votes in the second round of elections is considered to have been elected as a People's Assembly deputy. If votes are divided equally, the deputy is chosen by lot.

Article 10. Subjects fielding joint candidates in constituencies, at the same time as they appoint their candidates, also send to the constituency electoral commission a report according to which the votes cast jointly and collected nationwide are to be distributed. A copy of this document is sent to the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 11. Additional mandates are distributed as follows:

a) Only subjects that gain no less than 4 percent of the votes nationwide and electoral groups of two parties that have no less than 8 percent of the votes benefit from

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the distribution of the 25 additional mandates. When an electoral group is composed of three or more parties, the threshold increases by 4 percent for each party.

b) The total number of valid votes cast in the first round for additional mandates for electoral subjects is counted. The total number of valid votes cast for each of the subjects fulfilling the conditions under section a) is then counted. The number of valid votes for each of these subjects is divided by the total number of votes cast for additional mandates, and the resulting figure is multiplied by 25, being the number of additional mandates.

c) Each list compiled by electoral subjects receives as many seats as the whole number that results from the calculations under section b). Seats that remain unallocated are given to the electoral subject that gains the largest number of seats in the elections in the constituencies.

ch) [fourth letter of Albanian alphabet] Those winning on the lists of multiple candidates are decided according to their order on the list.

d) When the number of candidates on a list is less than the number of seats this list has won, the candidate of this electoral subject who has won the largest number of votes of all this electoral subjects candidates in any constituency, but has not won in the relevant constituency and does not appear on the list of the electoral subject concerned is declared the winner. When there are two such candidates, the winner is decided by lot.

Chapter III

Electoral Subjects

Article 12. Any Albanian citizen who enjoys the right to be elected according to this law may stand as a candidate for the post of People's Assembly deputy as a representative of any party or group of parties or as an independent candidate.

No candidate can stand in more than one single-member constituency.

Any candidate in a single-member constituency may also at the same time appear as a candidate on the list of the relevant subject. A candidate who wins in a constituency is removed from his subjects nationwide list.

Article 13. A candidate for the post of People's Assembly deputy is registered by the electoral commission no later than 20 days before the election day. To register it is necessary to present the following documents:

a) a written request from the relevant electoral subject asking for the registration of the candidate offering himself as a deputy; the request must include the candidates name, father's name, surname, date of birth, and place of residence. (two copies)

b) a statement by the candidate himself accepting his candidature in that constituency. (two copies)

c) a copy of the verdict of the State Commission on the basis of Article 9 of the Law on the Screening of Officials and Other Persons Involved in the Protection of the Democratic State, No. 8,043 of 30 November 1995.

ch) a list signed by no less than 400 electors of the relevant constituency, who support the nomination of this candidate in that constituency.

Article 14. The list of voters' signatures must include the name and emblem of the electoral subject nominating the candidate or a note stating that the candidate is independent. This list must also include the name, father's name, surname, address, identity card number or certificate number accompanied by a photograph, in the handwriting of the voter, who must be a resident in the constituency in which the candidate is running.

A voter does not have the right to sign more than one list. The lists are deposited with the Central Electoral Commission and can be inspected for its proper authorization.

When a constituency electoral commission notices irregularities in the application or documentation of a candidate for registration, it informs the electoral subjects, asking for these irregularities to be corrected within two days of their being noticed. Otherwise, the election commission takes appropriate action.

Article 15. Only electoral subjects who have fielded candidates in no fewer than 38 constituencies and 12 districts of the country have the right to present lists for additional mandates. Lists for additional mandates may include up to 100 candidates. When groups of electoral subjects fulfill this condition, each of the political parties that is a member of this group presents a separate electoral list. Copies of the decision of the State Commission on the basis of Article 9 of the Law on the Screening of Officials and Other Persons Involved in Protecting the Democratic State, No. 8,043 of 30 November 1995, and of the candidates statement accepting his candidature are attached to the list.

The list with the signature and seal of the relevant electoral subject is submitted to the Central Electoral Commission no later than 30 days before the election day.

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Article 16. Constituency election commissions, when the conditions of this law are met, are obliged to register all the candidates for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly and to announce them no later than 25 days before the election day, also noting the name of the subject that has nominated them. It sends a copy of this certificate to all the candidates of the electoral subjects.

Article 17. The constituency electoral commission retains a protocol of the registration procedure of every candidate. It sends a copy of this to the Central Electoral Commission together with the statement by the candidate accepting his candidature in this zone.

Article 18. When a candidate for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly is withdrawn by the subject proposing him, withdraws his own candidature, or dies after having being registered by the constituency electoral commission, the subject concerned may register another candidate, but not later than seven days before the election day. If such a thing occurs during the seven days before the elections, the electoral subject submits in his place another candidate from the party list of candidates.

Article 19. If directors of local government authorities, members of the organs of justice, directors of the organs of public order and of the National Intelligence Service, and servicemen on active service submit themselves as candidates to be deputies, they are released from their duties 25 days before the day of the elections.

Chapter IV

Electoral Rolls

Article 20. Elections of deputies to the People's Assembly take place on the basis of electoral rolls.

All citizens who enjoy the right to vote are registered on the electoral rolls. The authority responsible under this law for compiling the electoral rolls, when it registers voters as temporarily resident on its territory, is obliged to inform the relevant authority in the voters permanent place of residence to avoid registration in two places of residence.

Each citizen is registered on only one electoral roll.

Article 21. Electoral rolls are compiled for every polling station.

The electoral roll records the voters name, father's name, and surname, date of birth, and registration number.

Electoral rolls in towns and villages are drawn up under the responsibility of the chairman of the municipality or the commune and the secretary of the relevant council. The electoral rolls, having been signed by the aforementioned persons, are sent to the relevant prefecture. The prefect confirms them, and, if need be, settles any disagreements in connection with them.

The electoral rolls are published by the authorities compiling them no later than 30 days before the day of the elections.

The electoral rolls are kept permanently at civil registry offices.

The Council of Ministers issues the necessary instructions and administers them.

Article 22. In the case of voters serving and residing in military bases and units, the chairmen and secretaries of municipal or communal councils compile and publish the electoral rolls no later than 30 days before the day of the elections in cooperation with the commanders of the military bases and units.

All other servicemen are registered on the electoral rolls of their places of residence, as compiled by the authorities defined by this law.

Article 23. Albanian citizens permanently resident abroad who are within the territory of the Republic of Albania on the day of the elections are registered at their request on the electoral rolls of their former places of residence. The attendance of these persons at the polls is noted in their international passports.

Article 24. In hospitals, sanatoriums, in other health institutions and centers of rehabilitation, and in reeducation camps and places of detention, electoral rolls are compiled by the directors of the institution, reeducation camp, or place of detention, on the basis of the voters' documents of identification. These directors are obliged to tell the responsible local authorities in these voters' places of residence to change the electoral rolls on which these voters were initially registered.

Article 25. When a voter is appointed as a member of an electoral commission or an observer in a constituency or at a polling station, and for this reason will move from his place of residence after the publication of the electoral roll, the responsible authority issues a certificate before the day of the elections and at the request of the electoral subject, in order to enable this person to vote in the place where he is to go, and also marks the electoral roll with the words "Moved Away." This voter is registered on the supplementary list of voters of the polling station of the place where he goes, on the presentation of his certificate of the right to vote together with his identity card or substitute document.

Article 26. The authority that has published the electoral rolls may make changes to these rolls at the request of

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interested persons, but no later than 24 hours before the election day, when a citizen has died, is registered twice, does not enjoy electoral rights, or is resident outside the territory of the Republic of Albania.

Article 27. Every voter has the right to apply in writing for the correction of errors and omissions in the electoral rolls, such as nonregistration, change of name, father's name, or surname, the registration of persons who have lost their electoral rights, etc. These applications are made to the authority that has published the roll, and this authority is obliged to consider the case within two days and give a decision without supporting evidence.

Appeals against this decision may be made to the district court, which will consider the appeal in open court within three days and make an appropriate decision. The decision of the court is published immediately, is final, and is enforced by the commission of the polling station.

The constituency electoral commission intervenes at the request of citizens in order to request the authorities that have published the electoral laws to correct errors and omissions in these rolls.

Any change to the electoral rolls is published immediately.

Article 28. The list of electors is put at the disposal of the electoral subjects by the authorities that have published the lists, upon request and against payment.

Chapter V

Constituencies and Polling Stations

Article 29. For the election of People's Assembly deputies, 115 constituencies with approximately equal numbers of voters will be created. The constituencies must be in one piece, geographically continuous, and may not run across the borders of communes.

The constituencies, their borders, and their order are determined by the president of the republic on the proposal of the Council of Ministers no later than 45 days before the day of the elections.

Article 30. Votes are cast and counted at the polling stations, which are created in the territory of every town, urban neighborhood, and village.

Article 31. A polling station is created for every 100-800 electors in villages.

A polling station is created for every 800 electors in towns and urban neighborhoods.

Special polling stations are created in towns and urban neighborhoods with less than 800 electors. If more than 400 electors are left over, a special polling station is created, while if the number is less than 400, these electors are attached to the nearest existing polling station.

A special polling station is created if a place of work is more than three kilometers from the nearest polling station, and there are at least 50 electors.

Article 32. Polling stations are decided on no later than 20 days before the day of the elections.

Polling stations are created in towns, urban neighborhoods, and villages on the decision of the authorities that have published the electoral rolls.

Article 33. Polling stations are created in hospitals, sanatoriums, maternity homes, rest homes, and similar institutions, and in reeducation camps and places of detention, if there are more than 15 electors.

In health institutions with many wards, a special polling station may be created in each ward that contains more than 15 electors.

Chapter VI

Electoral Commissions

Article 34. The following electoral commissions are created to conduct the elections for the People's Assembly:

a) The Central Electoral Commission

b) The constituency electoral commissions

c) The polling station commissions.

Representatives of the electoral subjects and nonparty persons become members of the electoral commissions.

The electoral commissions are independent organizations, answerable for their activities only to the law.

The secretaries of the Central Electoral Commission and the constituency commissions must be lawyers.

These commissions make decisions by a majority of votes.

Article 35. The Central Electoral Commission consists of a chairman, a deputy chairman, a secretary, and 14 members.

The composition of the Central Electoral Commission is decided by the president of the republic on the proposal of the Council of Ministers and the political parties who have submitted electoral lists for the distribution of the additional mandates, no later than 45 days before the election day.

Political parties that do not have members in the Central Electoral Commission have the right to send observers.

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Article 36. The Central Electoral Commission mainly performs these duties:

a) It ensures the meticulous and fair enforcement of this law during the conduct of the elections throughout the territory of the Republic of Albania;

b) It prescribes the management of procedure and controls the activities of the constituency electoral commissions;

c) It considers appeals against illegal and irregular acts and activities on the part of the constituency electoral commissions;

ch) It registers and reports the participation in the elections of parties, groups of parties, and independent candidates, together with their symbols and emblems. No party or group of parties has the right, after registration, to use the symbols of another party or group of parties;

d) It exercises control over the registration in the constituencies of candidates for posts as People's Assembly deputies;

dh) [sixth letter of Albanian alphabet] It establishes rules for the participation of Albanian and foreign observers in the elections and supplies them with identifying documents;

e) It inspects when necessary the electoral rolls after the conclusion of the elections and informs the competent authorities when it ascertains that a citizen has voted more than once;

ë) [e-dieresis, eighth letter of Albanian alphabet] It reports the results of the elections and registers deputies to the Peoples Assembly;

f) It issues certificates of election to deputies elected on the basis of nationwide party lists.

Article 37. A constituency electoral commission is created in every constituency, consisting of a chairman, a deputy chairman, a secretary, and a representative of every electoral subject or electoral group fielding candidates in the constituency, as well as a member without a party allegiance, when the commission has an even number of members. The secretary and the nonparty member are chosen by the prefect, and the chairman and deputy chairman are chosen by the Central Electoral Commission.

The constituency electoral commissions are appointed as above by the Central Electoral Commission no later than 30 days before the election day. **Article 38.** A constituency electoral commission performs the following duties:

a) It supervises the meticulous and fair enforcement of this law during the conduct of the elections throughout the territory of the constituency;

b) It controls the activities of the polling station commissions during the conduct of the elections;

c) It supervises the arrangement of polling stations according to the law;

ch) If necessary, it asks the authorities that have compiled electoral rolls to correct errors and omissions observed in them;

d) It registers and announces the candidates for deputy that have been nominated according to the rules of this law;

dh) It registers representatives of candidates for posts of deputy nominated by different parties, groups of parties, and independent candidates, and provides them with the relevant certificates;

e) It counts the votes on the basis of the protocols of the polling stations and declares the results of the elections in the constituency;

ë) [e-dieresis] It considers complaints against illegal or irregular acts or activities on the part of the polling station commissions;

f) It issues to an elected deputy a certificate of his election;

g) It delivers to the Central Electoral Commission the election documentation laid down in this law.

Article 39. In every polling station, a polling station commission is created consisting of a chairman, a secretary, and a representative of every electoral subject or electoral group that has a candidate in this constituency, and one nonparty member when there is an even number on the commission. The secretary and the nonparty member are appointed by the prefect, and the chairman is appointed by the constituency commission.

The constituency electoral commission approves and announces the composition of the polling station commissions no later than 25 days before the election day.

Article 40. The polling station commission performs the following duties:

a) It ensures the free and peaceful conduct of the elections in the polling station, in accordance with this law;

b) It ensures that order is kept during the voting;

c) It counts the numbers of votes cast for every candidate for deputy;

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ch) It compiles and delivers to the constituency electoral commission the protocol of the voting;

d) It registers in the protocol complaints and requests of electors or candidates, considers them, and makes the appropriate decision;

dh) It sends to the constituency commission the documentation of the election, as prescribed in this law.

Article 41. The instructions of the chairman of the polling station commission during the time of the elections are binding on all citizens present in the polling station. These instructions can only be revoked by a decision of the polling station commission.

Article 42. The members of the electoral commissions can be released from their duties on these commissions by the authority that approved the commissions' composition, on the application of the members themselves or on the proposal of the electoral subjects they represent.

Article 43. Servicemen, personnel of the organs of public order and of the National Intelligence Service, and candidates for posts as People's Assembly deputies cannot be members of the commissions.

Article 44. Meetings of the electoral commissions are valid when more than one-half of their members take part. Decisions at these meetings are made by a majority of votes.

Meetings of the electoral commissions are public. Observers may also attend and have the right to make criticisms. At their request, these criticisms will be noted in the protocol of the commission's meeting.

Article 45. Electoral subjects with representatives on the electoral commissions have the right to present a list with the names of persons substituting for them. They may be substituted when they are unable to perform their duties. Their substitution takes place in the following way:

a) in the case of polling station commissions, on the application of the relevant electoral subject and by a decision of the constituency electoral commission;

b) in the case of constituency electoral commission, by a decision of the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 46. Persons who are members of the Central Electoral Commission or the constituency electoral commissions obtain paid leave from work from the day of their appointment, while members of the polling station commissions have the right to take paid leave from work five days before and two days after the voting.

The above persons are remunerated from the state budget, at a level determined by the Central Electoral Commission.

The level of remuneration for members of the Central Electoral Commission is determined by the president of the republic.

Article 47. All persons who are members of the electoral commissions are considered persons entrusted with state duties, in the sense used in the Penal Code, during the exercise of their duties.

Article 48. Members of the electoral commissions and observers, while they perform their duties, are forbidden to wear distinguishing marks or symbols of the parties or groups of parties to which they belong, or to carry out or participate in propaganda work for the elections.

Chapter VII

Appeals Against the Decisions of the Electoral Commissions

Article 49. Appeals against the decisions of the constituency electoral commissions can be lodged with the Central Electoral Commission within three days after these decisions are announced.

The Central Electoral Commission considers appeals and makes an appropriate decision within three days.

Article 50. Appeals against the decisions of the Central Electoral Commission may be lodged with the Constitutional Court within three days after these decisions are announced.

The Constitutional Court considers the appeal and gives a final decision within three days, which is announced immediately.

The decisions of the Constitutional Court issued following in response to appeals against the election results are reported to the Commission of Mandates of the new People's Assembly.

Chapter VIII

The Election Campaign

Article 51. The election campaign begins with the announcement of the election day and ends 24 hours before that date.

Article 52. During the election campaign, every electoral subject and citizen has the right to freely conduct propaganda through rallies, meetings, the radio, television, the press, and the other mass media.

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Any kind of propaganda in contravention of the law, the judicial order, or that affects the personal dignity of candidates is forbidden.

The publication of opinion polls in connection with the elections is suspended eight days before the election day.

Article 53. The election campaign on the state radio-television is conducted in programs specially devoted to it. In the first round of the elections, the space given to the electoral subjects is distributed among them according to the following rules:

1. Parties, which in the previous elections won seats in the People's Assembly, are allocated a total broadcast time of four hours, one-half of which belongs to the parties represented in the government and one-half to the nongoverning parties, according to their number of seats in the People's Assembly, but no less than 20 minutes.

2. All other electoral subjects, which have nominated candidates for deputies in no fewer than 15 constituencies, are allocated 10 minutes.

3. One day before the closure of the election campaign, all these subjects are permitted to compile short summaries of their programs addressed to the electorate, of up to five minutes.

In the second round, the amount of time placed at the disposal of the electoral subjects, in accordance with the regulations above, is halved.

No less than five days after the creation of the Central Electoral Commission, the management of Albanian Radio-Television must send to the commission the platform and program of the electoral broadcasts to be made available to the electoral subjects.

The Central Electoral Commission organizes on Albanian Radio-Television programs for the education of the population about the elections, without party bias.

Article 54. Candidates and electoral subjects have the right to use different propaganda material such as slogans, announcements, pamphlets, etc., on which the name of the electoral subject preparing the material must be noted. This material may not be damaged until after the campaign.

Local government authorities must secure equal opportunities for the propaganda of every electoral subject.

Article 55. The conduct of the election campaign is forbidden in military bases and units and in apolitical institutions. The commanders of military bases and units will allow the use of the mass media during free time, and also participation in the election campaign outside the bases and units, but within the territory of the constituency.

Article 56. Persons who do not have Albanian citizenship are forbidden to take part in the election campaign.

Article 57. Local government authorities and all other state authorities have no right to distribute electoral propaganda material or to assist in the conduct of propaganda.

Article 58. The state contributes to the election campaigns of the electoral subjects in the following way:

a) Fifty percent of the sum allocated is distributed to the electoral subjects in proportion to the number of candidates for deputy they have registered.

b) Fifty percent of the sum allocated is distributed to the parties in accordance with the number of votes they gained nationwide in the previous elections.

If an electoral subject does not win more than 3 percent of the votes in all the constituencies where it has stood, it is obliged to return to the state the sum given to it in finance.

The Finance Ministry is charged with the task of issuing financial regulations for the use and control of the funds granted.

Article 59. It is forbidden to insult or slander candidates for deputy and electoral subjects.

Article 60. It is forbidden to break up or disrupt legitimate electoral meetings and rallies.

Article 61. The jobs of candidates for posts as People's Assembly deputies, when they take leave from work during the election campaign, are kept for them and they are paid in full when they are employed by the state, and in other cases are paid by the Central Electoral Commission.

The jobs of persons mentioned in Article 19 are not kept.

Article 62. Candidates for deputy cannot be held penally responsible, arrested, or detained, except when they commit obvious and serious crimes.

Chapter IX

The Voting

Article 63. The voting for People's Assembly deputies takes place on premises decided on by the local government authorities in the relevant administrative units in districts, regions, towns, urban neighborhoods, and villages.

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It is forbidden to use the buildings of political parties and apolitical state institutions as polling stations.

Article 64. Voting for People's Assembly deputys takes place on a nationwide nonworking day.

Voting begins at 0700 and ends at 2000. If there are still people waiting to vote at 2000, voting continues until all those present have finished.

The chairman of the polling station commission declares the start of the voting at 0700 on the polling day, in the presence of more than one-half of the members of the commission.

Voting begins with the inspection of the ballot boxes in the presence of the commission and the observers. The boxes are then closed and sealed with the seal of the polling station, which is carefully kept.

The chairman of the polling station commission, in the presence of the commission, stamps all the ballot papers in the top left-hand corner, and notes the number of them in the protocol, which is signed by all the members of the commission present.

After the ballot papers are stamped, the polling station commission chairman and the representatives of different parties sign the ballot papers on the right-hand side, in the presence of the members of the commission.

Article 65. Electors vote according to the order in which they arrive.

Every elector is obliged to prove his identity by presenting his identity card, his military identity card in the case of servicemen, or his international passport in the case of those coming from abroad, including a photograph in every case.

When an elector does not possess the identity documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph, he must apply to the civil registry office of his place of residence for a special voting certificate.

Servicemen are not allowed to arrive at the polling station in ordered ranks or with weapons. Only servicemen on duty are allowed to arrive in uniform.

After an elector's identity documents are checked against the electoral roll, the elector signs the electoral roll. After the number of his identity document is noted, the elector takes a ballot paper and votes. After the voting, the final page of his identity document is stamped.

When it is noticed that a ballot paper is not in order, it is set aside, recorded, signed as invalid, and replaced with another one by the chairman.

Article 66. The voting room may have several booths in order to hasten the voting. It is forbidden for the booths in the voting room to contain ballot papers.

The table of the commission is positioned in such a way as to enable the members of the commission and the representatives of the electoral subjects to move freely around it. The ballot boxes are positioned in a place visible to everyone present.

It is forbidden for any other person or member of the polling station commission to be present in the voting booth, except in cases when the voter cannot complete the necessary voting procedure himself and asks for assistance from a person he has selected. The chosen person has the right to accompany only one elector. In these cases, he obtains permission from the chairman of the polling station commission, and this is noted on the electoral roll.

It is not allowed to vote openly or outside the booths in the polling room. In such cases, the vote is considered invalid and is torn up by the commission before it is put into the ballot box, while the elector is given the opportunity to vote again.

When there is an elector in the polling booth, it is forbidden for any other person to be nearer than three meters from the booth.

If it is necessary to impose order in the polling station, the chairman of the polling station commission can seek assistance from the police.

Armed persons are forbidden to enter the polling station.

Electoral subjects have the right to send to each polling station one observer, who is equipped with authorization from the constituency electoral commission.

Article 67. Voting is carried out on a standard ballot paper, a model of which is attached to this law. Ballot papers are identical in shape, size, color, and kind of paper. Constituency electoral commissions are given 10 percent more ballot papers than the number of electors registered on their relevant electoral rolls.

The ballot paper is clearly divided into two parts. Votes for candidates as deputies are on the left, and votes for electoral subjects are on the right. The symbol of the electoral subject and the names of the candidates are on the left, listed according to the alphabetical order of the electoral subjects to which they belong. The words independent candidate are written in the case of independent candidates. The symbols and names of the electoral subjects who have submitted lists for the distribution of additional mandates appear on the right, with their symbols, according to the alphabetical order of the electoral subjects.

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Article 68. The left-hand part of the ballot paper, which records the vote for the candidate for deputy to be elected directly for the constituency, is valid when the elector leaves unmarked only the name of the candidate for which he is voting and crosses out with a line the names of all the other candidates. The right-hand side of the ballot paper, which records the vote for the electoral subject submitting a list for the distribution of additional mandates, is valid when the elector leaves unmarked only the name of the electoral subject he favors.

Article 69. All ballot papers that are erroneously completed, torn, damaged, or used are preserved for the final inventory and inspection.

Article 70. When there are serious violations of the voting procedure, the polling station commission may decide to suspend the voting until these violations are corrected. This decision is reported immediately to the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 71. A ballot paper with the names of the constituency's candidates for deputy and the electoral subjects lists of candidates for deputy nationwide are posted outside the polling room or in another obvious place where they can be read.

Chapter X

Results of the Voting

Article 72. Immediately after the voting ends, the chairman of the polling station commission, in the presence of the commission and the authorized observers:

a) declares the voting over;

b) counts the number of electors who have voted according to the lists, which must be signed by the commission's chairman and secretary, and any representative of an electoral subject who so wishes.

The lists are inserted in an envelope that is stamped with the same seal of the polling station. The envelope is signed by the chairman and the secretary of the commission and representatives of electoral subjects who so wish. The envelope is delivered to the constituency electoral commission, from whom the relevant certificate is obtained.

c) counts the number of unused ballot papers, which are handled in the way described in the second paragraph of section b).

These steps must be carried out in the above order and noted in the final protocol.

Article 73. After these steps have been carried out:

a) The ballot box is opened, and one of the members of the commission, decided by lot, takes out a ballot paper and hands it to the chairman, who audibly states whether the vote is valid and for which candidate and electoral subject its votes belong. He gives this ballot paper to all the other members of the commission and all observers present to see. Only when its results have been recorded and the ballot paper has been put in an appointed place can another ballot paper be taken out;

b) The number of used, valid, and invalid ballot papers is recorded;

c) It is checked that their number corresponds to the figures in the protocol, and they are recounted if necessary.

These steps are carried out in the above order, and the procedure is recorded in the protocol.

Article 74.

1. Ballot papers are invalid:

a) when they are do not match standards of shape, size, color, kind of paper, and text, and do not carry the relevant seal and signatures of the constituency.

b) when other names are added to the ballot paper.

c) when the ballot paper is marked with writing or other signs that allow the identity of the elector to be understood.

The polling station commission considers the validity of the vote. Dubious votes are first examined and subsequently assessed. Any objection by the members of the committee is noted in the protocol and these ballot papers are preserved separately.

2. A vote for a candidate for deputy is invalid when more than one candidate on the left-hand side of the ballot paper is left without being crossed out, or all the candidates are crossed out.

A vote for an electoral subject is invalid when more than one electoral subject on the right-hand side of the ballot paper is left without being crossed out, or all the electoral subjects are crossed out.

Article 75. When the voting has ended and the votes have been considered and counted, the relevant protocol is drawn up.

The protocol includes:

1. The number of the constituency and the polling station.

2. The times when the voting started and ended.

3. The number of voters on the electoral roll.

4. The number of voters on the additional list.

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5. The number of people who have voted according to the annotations on the electoral rolls.

6. The number of invalid ballot papers.

7. The number of valid votes a) for each candidate and b) for each electoral subject.

8. The number of invalid votes a) for each ccandidate and b) for each electoral subject.

9. The number of ballot papers set aside unused before the voting.

10. The number of unused ballot papers.

11. The number of copies in which the protocol has been drawn up.

12. The various comments made by individual members of the commission and observers.

The data under items 3 to 11 are provided in figures and words.

Each page of the protocol is signed. Any corrections are signed, with the annotation correction.

Every electoral subject has the right to receive a copy of the protocol.

Article 76. The polling station commission sends to the constituency electoral commission copies of the protocol with the results of the voting, in at least two copies, one of which is for the Central Electoral Commission, as well as the ballot papers, the seals, the ballot boxes, and all other material.

All this material is handed over personally by the chairman and secretary of the polling station commissions, together with any representative of the electoral subjects who wishes to be present.

Article 77. The constituency electoral commission compiles the results of the voting on the basis of the data in the protocols of the polling stations and announces them in the form of a protocol, which includes:

1. the number of the constituency.

2. the number of the polling stations.

3. the polling stations that have submitted protocols.

4. the number of electors according to the electoral rolls.

5. the number of electors on the additional lists.

6. the number of those who voted, according to the annotations on the electoral rolls.

8. [no seven as published] the number of valid votes: a) for each candidate b) for each electoral subject.

9. the number of invalid votes: a) for the candidates b) for the electoral subjects.

10. the number of ballot papers set aside unused before the voting.

11. the number of unused ballot papers.

12. the number of copies in which the protocol has been drawn up.

13. the first name, father's name, and surname of the winning candidate, and, if a second round of elections must be held, the first name, father's name, and surname of the leading two candidates.

14. complaints, criticisms, and decisions on these matters.

The data under items four to 12 are given in figures and words.

Article 78. The constituency electoral commission must send to the Central Electoral Commission a copy of every protocol it has kept, and of the protocols submitted by the polling station commissions.

The constituency electoral commission sends to the relevant prefecture the envelopes, ballot papers, and all other material that arrives from the polling stations.

The above material is delivered by the chairman and secretary of the constituency electoral commission and any representative of the electoral subjects who wishes to be present.

Article 79. The Central Electoral Commission declares the results of the elections and publishes them in the Official Gazette [Fletorja Zyrtare] no later than 10 days after the conclusion of the second round.

All the material of the Central Electoral Commission, including the ballot papers and seals collected from the prefectures, is sent to the archive of the People's Assembly no later than 10 days after the conclusion of the elections and the settlement of any possible conflict.

After the Commission of Mandates and Immunity of the new legislature of the People's Assembly has verified the mandates, the Presidium of the People's Assembly, having sounded the opinion of this commission, decides for how long the ballot papers must be preserved. This period must not be longer than four years.

Chapter XI

Termination of the Mandates of People's Assembly Deputies

Article 80. The mandate of a People's Assembly deputy lasts four years, except when the People's Assembly is dissolved early on the basis of the Main Constitutional Dispositions. The mandate begins on the day on which

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the legislature of the People's Assembly meets for its first session, and ends on the day on which the next assembly meets. After the People's Assembly is dissolved, before the meeting of a new People's Assembly, the assembly can be reconvened by a decree of the president, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers.

The mandate of a People's Assembly deputy also ends before its due time in the following cases:

a) when a deputy resigns;

b) when a deputy is declared guilty of a crime by a final verdict of a court;

c) when a deputy refuses to take the oath laid down in the rules of the People's Assembly;

ch) when a deputy loses the right to be elected for one of the reasons mentioned in this law;

d) when a deputy dies.

Article 81.

When the mandate of a deputy comes to an end before its due time, the Commission of Mandates of the People's Assembly replaces the deputy whose mandate has ended before its due time by choosing the next candidate from the electoral list of the relevant electoral subject, who has not gained a seat from the distribution of seats according to the nationwide electoral list. When there is no such candidate, this mandate is given to the candidate nominated by the same electoral subject in one of the constituencies who gained the largest number of votes without winning in his constituency and without figuring on the electoral list of the relevant subject. When there are two such candidates, the deputy is chosen by lot.

When a deputy undertakes another duty incompatible with his mandate, he is replaced by the procedure described in the first paragraph of this article.

Chapter XII

Penal and Administrative Dispositions

Article 82.

Anybody who, in his own interests or on behalf of third persons, offers money, employment, or other favors of whatever kind in exchange for a signature for the nomination of a candidate, a vote for or against a candidate, or for nonparticipation in the voting is liable to imprisonment for between six months and three years.

Electors who accept money, jobs, or other favors of whatever kind for such behavior are also liable to the same punishments.

Those who threaten or coerce electors into such behavior are liable to the same punishments.

Article 83.

Anybody who, in his on interests or on behalf of third persons, distributes money, consumer goods, or other gifts in any way during the election campaign or on election day, in order to influence the elections, is liable to imprisonment of between one and three years.

Article 84.

Breaches of other regulations of this law are punished by fines of 10,000-50,000 leks, except in cases when these misdemeanors constitute penal acts.

Article 85.

The amount of the fine is increased from 50,000 leks to 100,000 leks in cases when the breach of these regulations is against the proper preservation and administration of the ballot papers, the electoral rolls, the ballot boxes, and the protocols of the voting, except in cases when the misdemeanor constitutes a penal act.

Article 86.

Persons entrusted with tasks on the basis of this law, when they do not apply the regulations under Articles 84 and 85 of this law, are liable to fines of 100,000 leks to 150,000 leks, except in cases when the misdemeanor constitutes a penal act.

Article 87.

Decisions for punishments by fines for administrative misdemeanors are made by the constituency electoral commissions or the Central Electoral Commission.

Decisions for punishment by fines, in their final form, have an executive character.

Chapter XIII

Transitional and Final Dispositions

Article 88.

The Central Electoral Commission issues special instructions for the enforcement of this law.

Article 89.

In the sense of this law, the following can be considered observers:

—parliamentary representatives of OSCE member-states, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and other human rights organizations;

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—representatives of foreign political parties and movements and individuals invited by parties and groups of parties;

—representatives authorized by domestic and foreign institutions with specialist knowledge of elections.

Article 90.

Election observers, journalists, and media representatives accredited to our country will be equipped with special authorization by the Central Electoral Commission.

Election observers have the right to move freely throughout the territory of the Republic of Albania and to follow and observe all the activities conducted during the election campaign and on election day. They have the right to ask for and collect data and to state their opinions in public, as impartial representatives.

Article 91.

Albanian citizens permanently resident abroad or who have lived abroad for more than one year, who are present in Albania and wish to take part in the elections, must prove their identity with their international passport. They must sign a declaration to state that they do not possess a valid identity card within the territory of the Republic of Albania.

Article 92.

The Council of Ministers is charged with securing the material and financial resources for the organizational measures to enforce this law.

Article 93.

The Law on Elections to the Peoples Assembly No. 7,556 of 4 February 1992 and all other dispositions conflicting with this law are repealed.

Article 94.

This law comes into effect immediately.

Promulgated by the decree of Sali Berisha, president of the Republic of Albania, No. 1,358 of 3 February 1996.

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Bulgaria: Official Claims Support for Joining Neo-COCOM

AU0904141896 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 9 Apr 96 p 9

[Article by Mikhaylina Indzhova: "Countries of the Future Neo-COCOM Support Our Membership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The critical focus point in the new agreement on controlling the export of military and dual-use technologies, known as neo-COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls], is conventional weapons. Bulgaria was not invited to the Vienna meeting, at which 31 countries, in fact, failed to found the new organization. Georgi Dimitrov, head of the International Organizations Department of the Foreign Ministry, told DUMA that the countries agreed to place arms exports under certain controls, providing for the advance notification of arms exports and the observance of certain criteria. Dimitrov added that this could not be regarded as a prohibitory regime in any circumstances. The second aspect that must form the basis of the new agreement concerns the regulations for controlling exports of dual-use technologies. Bulgaria did not participate in the talks, so it has no direct information on the details of the disagreements that cropped up at the Vienna meeting, Dimitrov stressed.

Bulgaria has held consultations at the expert level with various countries that participated in the Vienna talks, such as the United States, Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Hungary, Slovakia, and Finland, Dimitrov said, adding: We wanted to explain to them the mechanism for export controls in Bulgaria so as to ensure the support of these countries and learn about their experience in this field. All the countries supported our application to join neo-COCOM, with the exception of the United States.

Dimitrov emphasized that a well-intentioned dialogue is being conducted with the United States. At the end of this month, our experts will leave for the United States, he said, and it is hoped that their experts will again visit our country. The reason for Washington's refusal to allow us to join in signing the new agreement is that, in the Americans' view, certain questions have not yet been cleared up. These are connected with the effectiveness of our export controls mechanism as a whole and with information on specific presumed arms deals with certain countries like Iran, Iraq, Sudan, the DPRK, Libya, Cuba, and so on. Washington considers that these deals should be transparent to a certain extent. We expect to finally dispel their doubts and obtain their support for joining neo-COCOM, Georgi Dimitrov said. The improved legislative ordinance for arms exports is already in force, including the new law on controlling such exports that the National Assembly passed at the end of 1995. Bulgaria's membership application is supported by many countries, including France, Russia, and the EU countries. To date, our country has taken repeated steps to join in creating the neo-COCOM. In November 1992, the government of the time issued a declaration on its adherence to the principles and rules of the international regimes for nonproliferation of weapons. In May 1994, the then foreign minister Stanislav Daskalov submitted our application to take part in negotiations on the new organization. In October 1995, we renewed our application, and in February this year Deputy Foreign Minister Irina Bokova again applied for membership.

Bulgaria: DPS Leader Indicates Support for Zhelev

AU0904130596 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 8 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Ahmed Dogan, leader of Rights and Freedoms Movement, by Diana Kapitanska, "including questions asked by other journalists"; place and date not given: "We Will Do Everything Possible To Overthrow the Videnov Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kapitanska] Mr. Dogan, the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] continues to keep secret whom it will officially support in the primaries—Zhelyu Zhelev or Petur Stoyanov. Why so?

[Dogan] The DPS is in a tricky position. Our two partners from the right and the center have their presidential candidates. We are committed to deciding which of them to support. We will probably ask our electorate to vote according to their consciences. The main aim is for the united opposition to have a common candidate, and we have to attain this goal at any cost. By this, I mean we have to be ready for any political compromises. From this point on, it has to be made understood to what extent cooperation can be achieved between the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], DPS, and the People's Union. It is not a matter of indifference to us who will win the primaries, but the real election is what counts.

[Kapitanska] However, in an interview you gave very recently to the TURKIYE newspaper, you unequivocally stated that the DPS will support Zhelev.

[Dogan] What I said was that our electorate indeed has a preference for Dr. Zhelev. This is the case because since 1989 Dr. Zhelev has performed great services in Europeanizing the problem of human rights in Bulgaria. Our voters are inclined to remember these things, and to remember them for a long time. For this reason, I find it very difficult to start making proclamations against Dr. Zhelev.

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[Kapitanska] The DPS national conference has been postponed several times. Why?

[Dogan] You must agree that no political party would risk holding a national conference in a situation when an election is pending in such an important municipality as Kurdzhali. We take this into account, and we will postpone the conference again if necessary. On 16 April, the Supreme Court is due to examine the Kurdzhali court case, and I presume that it will reach some verdict.

[Kapitanska] Nevertheless, if the issue of the Kurdzhali elections is not settled before the primaries, how will the DPS react?

[Dogan] The DPS Central Council is empowered to decide which of the two candidates to support, although such a decision should not be made solely by the Central Committee, nor by an expanded forum. It should be adopted at the national level by delegates with representative rights. Unfortunately, however, there is no time because we have to be ready by 1 June.

[Kapitanska] A year ago you predicted that Zhan Videnov's cabinet would not last long. Do you still hold this view?

[Dogan] Yes, I do. At this stage, the overthrow of Zhan Videnov is not a problem for us. However, the socialist government has to sweep away the negative atmosphere, the entire negative energy of the Bulgarian people. If the opposition were now offered a term in office as a present, it would never agree. About $700 million will be needed in June to service the foreign debt, and a similar amount will be needed at the end of the year. The state's reserves now stand at about $230 million. In this situation, if you were to offer me a term in office, I would turn my back. We have two and a half million pensioners; let them finally realize why they voted for the BSP.

[Kapitanska] If the opposition candidate wins the presidential elections, some say that this will provoke early parliamentary elections.

[Dogan] This is not a mere speculation, this is a goal. We will do everything possible to overthrow the government by parliamentary and extraparliamentary means. In my opinion, the first suitable moment for a political crisis is around the New Year.

[Kapitanska] You recently also told the Turkish media of your proposal to form a Balkan center for Turkish communities. At the moment, are there any real moves to implement this idea?

[Dogan] The idea has been circulating for several years. Now that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has ended, perhaps it is now the time to develop some kind of strategy in the Balkans. We have something to offer, which is the Bulgarian model for solving ethnic problems.

Bulgaria: GOR Leader Tomov Agrees To Run for President

AU0904164996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksandur Tomov has agreed for the Civic Alliance for the Republic [GOR] to nominate him as a candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections. GOR announced this at a news conference today. The official announcement of Tomov's candidature will probably be made on 20 April, when GOR will hold its Third National Conference.

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Czech Republic: Zieleniec Discusses European Integration

AU1004111896 Prague PRAVO in Czech 3 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec by Josef Vesely; place and date not given: "As Europeans, We Perceive Mostly What We Have in Common"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vesely] When do you believe the talks will begin on the admission to the European Union of new member countries? This was also discussed in Turin. Your Italian counterpart, Susanna Agnelli, mentioned two years to journalists. You yourself tend toward the time horizon of 18 months.

[Zieleniec] There used to be concerns about the possibility of the intergovernmental conference lasting—because of the complexity of the agenda and differences of opinion—as long as several years. I believe that the heads of states and governments reacted to these concerns in a manner that will have an effective impact on the actual length of the conference. They themselves simply spoke in favor of concluding it within one year.

The resolution from the Hungarian summit of December 1995 says that the preparations on the part of the EU must be completed so that the talks with membership hopefuls could be actually started within six months thereafter. Minister Agnelli said it now straight out to the representatives of the associate countries—the talks are on the agenda six months after the work of the conference is completed. Simple arithmetic indicates that in approximately 18 months—perhaps several months more—the talks between the EU and the Czech Republic should also begin.

[Vesely] You do not have the feeling that, after signing the EU application and after you said at the Civic Democratic Party conference that in the matter of European integration you believe in a consensus even with the democratic opposition, the truly profound debate on the entry into the EU is being postponed until the next elections in 2000?

[Zieleniec] I truly believe so, and there are a couple of reasons for this. First, at that time, the public will have gained access to many more details as a basis for discussion. Launching direct membership talks will certainly give rise to specific problems. I would like to mention those that emerged during the talks with Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway. These problems extend from fundamental political approaches through the combined truck transit in the Alpine foothills, northern agriculture in Finland, fishing in Norway, and chewing tobacco in Sweden. Nevertheless, I also have the feeling that European problems will become a part of our domestic political life long before the start of the next election campaign.

The other reason for this deep discussion taking place is the fact that the government will need a clear mandate from the voters for such a significant decision. This is because a part of the sovereignty of the state is to be transferred to the European bodies. We will apparently decide for a referendum. Such a referendum, however, can only answer YES or NO. The election campaign will make it possible to analyze the problems in more detail and will give the voters a chance to comment on the entire spectrum of views held by various political parties.

[Vesely] Some deputies—not only European but also ours—intervene, saying that it is time to begin a basic educational campaign and also assign funds for this purpose. Will the government release funds for this purpose?

[Zieleniec] You are talking about money, but that certainly is not everything. The discussion about the European Union and our place in it is starting because it is topical and interesting already today. The very fact that PRAVO provides space for it in this interview is symptomatic. And just look at the television programs and at other media, where minute details are being discussed.

The government could provide neutral information within the framework of a basic educational campaign. The citizens should make up their own minds and then, as voters, decide. As the dynamics of the political pressure of the problem grows, such decisions will certainly be adopted on the government level. If we check when the countries that completed the talks with the EU decided on such steps, we learn that the Czech Republic has not yet missed anything.

[Vesely] You may agree, however, that practical information, although important for decisionmaking of the citizen as consumer or businessman, cannot reach the ear of the public as easily as the statements, for instance, of leading politicians.

[Zieleniec] I agree that the public must be provided with the necessary core of real knowledge without a political burden, and the government will do its best in this respect.

[Vesely] It is a real paradox that the Czech Government is ascribed—in the newspapers and European political circles—with a pragmatic character, is said to prefer pragmatic questions while remaining cool, for instance, to discussions on common foreign and security policies.

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[Zieleniec] I would not say, however, that they directly reproach us about anything. Of course, different views exist even in Brussels regarding the general direction of European integration and what it should look like in various spheres. It greatly progressed in the economic sphere, but questions of the economic and monetary union remain open. In addition to the common foreign and security policies, cooperation in the matters of justice and interior belongs here.

If we take the agenda of the just opened intergovernmental conference in Turin, these are precisely the questions that are discussed there. I would like to repeat that the Czech Republic will join such a European Union as it is at the time we finish the talks on our admission as a full member. This means that, similarly to other partners, we can discuss our different views, our priorities. After all, the EU is an association of nations, each of which brought its own authentic experience into the development of Europe. That is the origin of the European Union.

The chief question in the matter of the common foreign and security policies is how deep to go and what mechanisms to choose. It is a topic for discussion in the EU now, whether this should be decided by a general consensus as to date or maintain the right of every nation to protect its vital interests while introducing the majority system. Each nation should decide on its own where it will send its armed forces, how it will defend itself. All of this is being discussed now, after the Turin opening.

In the meantime, we are indirectly entering into the discussion. It is obvious that a nation that experienced in the past decades a complex period, precisely from the point of view of its own sovereignty, will approach such talks with more caution. That, too, is a legacy of the past. Constant contacts and debates with partners in the EU will certainly sooner or later blunt this hesitation.

[Vesely] A solution in the form of the so-called constructive exception is being discussed, whereby the state with a different view on a certain sensitive issue—if it is to send its troops, for instance, where it does not want to send them—would stand aside. However, it would lose its right to veto the decisions of others and their will to proceed jointly.

[Zieleniec] The idea of the so-called constructive exception is an example of the search for a solution to the tension between two poles, as we perceive them now—the British stand on one side, which almost absolutely emphasizes the state sovereignty, and the German or German-French pole on the other side, which is oriented more toward a formation of a federal type. So, it is good that a solution is sought that, even in the instance of a majority vote, would not force certain principal decisions with which they cannot identify in the sphere of their sovereignty onto the countries voting to the contrary or their citizens.

[Vesely] This concerns not only the military dimension but also the security of citizens in the face of crime, for instance.

[Zieleniec] Cooperation between the interior and justice sectors is one of the focal issues in the discussion on the future of European integration. That is given, among other things, by the fact that national borders ceased to have any effect on criminals a long time ago, and organized crime has a high degree of international coordination. Therefore, the decent people must also join more effectively. At this time, coordination is based on intergovernmental cooperation rather than some suprastate direction from a Brussels center. One of the reforms to be discussed at the intergovernmental conference consists of the transfer of some of this cooperation to the community sphere, which is taken out of the sovereignty of the state. It concerns, above all, the matter of conquering organized crime and illegal trade in narcotics. I believe that simple logic will lead to this being the first step in the sector of internal security that will succeed. I further believe that the Czech Republic, as a country with firsthand experience of the power of international crime following the opening of the border, which is also given by its geographic location, should have understanding for this. At the same time, our country wants to remain open for normal international contacts.

[Vesely] The euro-atlantic endeavors of the Czech Republic sometimes overlap with the efforts to join the EU, which also speaks about joint defense. Since 1948, there is also the Western European Union (WEU). Some people advise us to join it rather than NATO because it would not cross Moscow that much.

[Zieleniec] I have the feeling that, even when external influence is argued, the motives are more Central European. It is the same discussion about the future shape of the EU all over again, about the degree of its integration and the sovereignty of the states, which is projected also into this sphere. The WEU is not yet a part of the EU. For many states the WEU is a possible pillar of the common European defense, for others it is not.

When I took a certain inventory of the stands of the Czech Republic on similar discussions—in which we do not directly participate but formulate our views publicly—I determined that we are comparable with the average within the framework of the EU. For every view, we can find a grouping of countries with an

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opinion similar to ours, and also a grouping of countries holding the opposite view. When you mention the WEU and the conceivable assumption of the responsibility for the defense of the member countries while reducing the role of the North Atlantic alliance, I can immediately tell you that, in addition to Great Britain, Denmark and Portugal say that, according to them, that is not the right way. Various states in different permutations express such views.

I would like to ask the reader not to derive from this any idea of chaos. The European Union is a place for open discussions, where some kind of solution is always reached, and, as a rule, the others accept the outcome. The historical experience of the EU members differs, as do their interests, but we perceive ever more—as Europeans facing the globalization of world politics, and development in the Middle East and the Pacific—what brings us together rather than what divides us.

So, Europe is gradually becoming more ready to act, more competitive, and safer for its citizens.

Czech Republic: KDU-CSL Trying 'To Curb' ODS's Power

AU0904130496 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "(jik, rea)": "Lux Has Admitted That the KDU-CSL Is Looking For a Way To Curb the ODS's Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] Chairman Josef Lux has admitted that his party is seeking a means of curbing the power of the strongest party in the state—the Civic Democratic Party [ODS].

"I have registered the view expressed by the ODS that the opposition, the small coalition parties, and the president are looking for ways—such as the institute of ombudsman, higher territorial units, a nonpolitical senate, professional chambers, or non-profit-making organizations—to curb the ODS's power and influence. I have to say in response to this: Yes, it is so," declared Lux yesterday.

He added that the ODS cannot govern without any kind of supervision. "The ODS is the strongest of the political entities, but its group of voters is not dominant among the citizens of this state. It does not have 98 or 51 percent, but about 30 percent of electoral support. It cannot, then, govern absolutely," said the people's party chairman.

However, Vaclav Klaus, ODS chairman and prime minister, rejected Lux's comments. "I always laugh at these pronouncements. And, despite the fact that I do not wish to respond to them because I do not want to cause a chain reaction, I will make a brief comment. Throughout the past four years, the ODS has not been in charge of agriculture, the Army, industry, and privatization. It was not responsible for economic competition or legislation. I think that, insofar as these are important spheres of our lives, it seems really perplexing to me to talk about an attempt at absolute power," said Klaus after his talks yesterday with the head of the chamber of physicians.

"Mr. Lux has for some time been outlining his reservations about the ODS and its sizable representation in the government," said Jana Petrova, the ODS spokeswoman, yesterday. She added that the ODS has never governed absolutely. "Supervision of the mechanisms of power is provided by the political system. There are several political parties, the individual parliamentary committees supervise the government, parliament—where there is also an opposition—approves the government's proposals, and there are the courts," stated the spokeswoman.

Czech Republic: Ministry Assesses Effects of CSFR Split

AU0904125196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Karol Wolf in the "SME in the Czech Republic" column: "Czech Foreign Ministry Report States That Prague Made Maximum Use of the CSFR's Partition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—In its section devoted to Czechoslovakia's partition and its repercussions, a report drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic states, among other things, that Czech foreign policy made maximum use of all of the positive factors that arose from the partition of the former federation and, on the other hand, maximally cushioned the impact of objective difficulties. "In relation to Slovakia, we have achieved a situation that is characterized by stable and correct relations between two standard partners. At the same time, we seized the opportunity to successfully present the new state, in comparison with both the former federation and the other successor state," it is stated in the report, inter alia. Furthermore, Czech diplomacy evaluates as positive the fact that the Czech Republic has succeeded, once and for all, in extricating itself from the zone of instability and in eliminating, through border change, the potential threat of the transfer of instability from the countries of the former USSR. The end to uncertainty over the constitutional arrangement of the state significantly helped to further the progress of a calm and consistent economic transformation, according to the report. As for the negative factors of the federation's partition, Czech diplomacy

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includes among them the actual reduction of the country's size and the resulting weakening of the foreign political and economic potential. "The marked reduction of our potential has highlighted the significance of our being a neighbor of united Germany," the report states. Czech diplomacy evaluates as partially negative also the results of the division of federal property and the development of mutual trade and economic linkages. The report notes, however, that problems were to be expected and that, judging by the situation today, the level of their solution is satisfactory and meets realistic expectations.

Czech Republic: AERO Chooses Taiwanese Engines for L-159's

AU0904141196 Prague PRAVO in Czech 9 Apr 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Taiwanese Engines for the L-159 Aircraft"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vodochody—F-12 engines produced by the U.S.-Taiwanese International Turbine Engine Corporation (ITEC) are to be installed in the L-159 aircraft, which will be among the Czech Army's equipment. It should gradually incorporate 72 of them into its weaponry. The state has provided a guarantee of approximately 1.5 billion korunas [Kc] for the aircraft's development.

AERO is putting Kc1 billion into development, the Army Kc400 million, and the foreign partners another Kc400 million. The investment part will cost AERO a further Kc1 billion. So, the project as a whole will cost Kc2.8 billion. AERO has to sell at least another 160 of these aircraft abroad to make sure the development and production of the L-159 is profitable for the enterprise.

Czech Republic: Modernization of T-72 Tanks Under Way

LD0804204296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Defense is continuing the project of the modernization of T-72 tanks, despite opposition of the parliament's Paramilitary and Security Committee.

This has been confirmed by Miroslav Kalousek, deputy minister of defense for the economy. He added that the Ministry of Defense provided altogether 107 million korunas for this project to Novy Jicin military repairs enterprise this year.

Kalousek, however, said that information on the modernization of MiG-21 fighters was misleading and untrue.

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Slovakia: Kovac Departs for PRC, Comments on Visit

LD0904180496 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, less than an hour ago, the Slovak Republic President Michal Kovac left the Bratislava airport for the country of the Rising Sun [China]. Editor Igor Skocek interviewed him shortly before departure:

[Begin recording] [Skocek] President, I have a general question: What do you expect from the visit?

[Kovac] You know that China is a world power whose influence and importance in the world is increasing all the time. Most importantly, it is a country with a huge market, and the Slovak Republic naturally wants to be present in this market not only in this century, but also in the next century. [passage omitted] I expect that this visit will confirm before the world, before the Chinese as well as before our citizens, that Slovakia is at the right place at the right time, and that it will give rise to numerous new impulses for the cooperation that has already started as well as for some new projects in which we would like to be involved.

[Skocek] President, if I may I would like to ask you one question that has nothing to do with your visit. We have learned from the TASR news agency that you returned the amendment to the Penal Code to the National Council of the Slovak Republic [parliament]. How do you explain this action?

[Kovac] Well, I do not want to talk about how I would explain it. The explanation is very simple, in fact. We cannot protect the state, the Republic, at the expense of the rights of citizens. In this respect, I highly value the standpoint of Father Cardinal Jan Korec [bishop of Nitra], who said that the protection of basic human rights comes first and that protection of the constitutional democratic system and of the territorial integrity only come second. Although these are important issues, I do not think we can resolve this matter at the expense of the most important issue, which is the protection of basic human rights. [end recording]

Slovakia: Meciar, Schenk React to EU Statement

AU0904154196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Apr 96 pp 1, 2

[Report by "od, TASR": "Vladimir Meciar Predicted EU's Negative Reaction, But Did Not Expect It So Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar reckoned in advance with the EU's negative reaction to the Penal Code amendment, but did not expect the reaction to come before 15 April. This was imparted to PRAVDA by a source close to the Slovak Government that did not wish to be named.

According to this source, the government was afraid that the reaction would be even sharper. In October last year, the EU "troika" submitted to Meciar a demarche, in which it expressed fears regarding the state of democracy in Slovakia.

"Something was expected, but only after 15 April. Minister of Justice Jozef Liscak was to explain the rationale behind the amendment in Brussels on 16 April. Someone was in a hurry," our source stated and indicated that Meciar had to accept a compromise between two evils, one of which was smaller. He was referring to the agreement with the Slovak National Party (SNS), under which the SNS pledged to support the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty in exchange for the Penal Code amendment.

As this source revealed further, Prime Minister Meciar reckoned in advance that, ultimately, the amended law, criticized by the opposition and the broad Slovak public, would not be sanctioned by the Constitutional Court.

On 3 April the EU expressed concern about some provisions in the amended version of the Slovak Penal Code. According to the EU declaration, issued in Brussels by the Italian Presidency in the name of all EU members, some provisions of the law contain changes that harm the freedom of expression and other democratic rights. The EU expects these provisions to be reexamined in a way compatible with the conclusions of the EU summit in Copenhagen and with the Slovak Republic's application to join the EU, it was stated in the declaration, which, on the other hand, appreciated and welcomed the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR].

On 4 April, Juraj Schenk, minister of foreign affairs of the Slovak Republic, also reacted to the EU declaration in an interview for TASR.

"In the name of the Italian Presidency, the EU in a very mild form expressed certain concern regarding the Penal Code amendment discussed in the NRSR," Juraj Schenk said. "I would like to express regret over the fact that the EU commented on the Penal Code amendment before this amendment acquired validity and went into effect and before all possibilities of the Slovak Republic' s legislation were exhausted."

"I would also want to express regret over the fact," Minister Schenk continued, "that this manner of EU reaction to the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic was again used by the EU without the Slovak Republic having

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an opportunity to present matters competently and to explain potential disinformation, as required by the Association Agreement in the event of misunderstandings or certain issues that have to be discussed."

Minister Schenk stressed that this regret is associated, above all, with the fact that "the Slovak Republic has prepared a whole number of specific activities aimed at the attainment of precisely this task" arising from the Association Agreement. "At the same time, I want to confirm that the Government of the Slovak Republic is prepared to carry on this dialogue with the EU," the Slovak minister of foreign affairs emphasized.

"As we have stressed on a number of occasions, we believe that equal dialogue between partners is the sole effective means of communication," the minister went on to say. As he added by way of explanation, the ministry discussed with EU representatives specific activities that the Slovak Republic would undertake with regard to the Penal Code amendment in relation to EU institutions or member countries. "We do not consider the situation to be dramatic, so it is not meaningful to deliver any official statement on this topic," Juraj Schenk said in conclusion of the interview for TASR. "We consider it necessary to conduct a partnership, equal dialogue."

Slovakia: EU Seen Giving 'Well-Intentioned Advice'

AU1004094696 Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak 6 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Ales Kratky: "A New Demarche?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We, as a small country, have once again raised our profile in Europe. The Penal Code amendment, approved by the Slovak Parliament more than a week ago, did not allow the EU to remain silent and it had to react to it. The EU's concern has been aroused by some provisions of the amendment. When we add the two demarches sent to Slovakia [last October], the question arises whether a third one is not in the making. The EU states in its declaration that the amendment appears to harm freedom of speech and other democratic rights of citizens. It expects us to carefully reexamine the controversial provisions of the Penal Code. Setting them right and bringing them into harmony with democratic principles in the West is a condition for our admission into the European community, which we have repeatedly declared to be our aim. A specific aspect of this law is, among other things, the fact that, according to those who submitted this legal norm, they were inspired by the legislation of EU member countries. The wording of penal codes valid in Sweden, Germany, Austria, and France supposedly served as guidance for those who drafted the amendment to our Penal Code. It has now been confirmed that this was not quite the case. The Swedish ambassador protested with National Council of the Slovak Republic Chairman Ivan Gasparovic against his argument that Swedish legislation served as a model for our law. Klaus Welle, general secretary of one of the largest parties in the European Parliament, only chuckled over the argument that German law had served as a model. He also pointed out that this law was abolished in 1990, with the GDR's extinction. The question remains to be asked, from what did we actually proceed when formulating this document? Even if, in the end, we do not find any models, it does not matter. The EU has warned us and it is simply up to our legislators how they come to terms with this well-intentioned advice. We must hope that they will not seek excuses, instead of addressing the problem in a businesslike manner, and will not let discussion slip to the level of whether the EU had or had not sent us a demarche.

Slovakia: SDL Chairman Views Hungarian Treaty Issues

AU0904112696 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by Gyorgy Jozsef Farkas: "Weiss: The Extremists Have To Be Pushed Aside"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the two countries and in Europe, the basic treaty will justify the hopes attached to it when we manage to push aside the extremists in the Slovak Republic—be they Slovaks or Hungarians—and in the Hungarian Republic; in other words, those people who try to use the whole issue for accumulating political capital for themselves, Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] in Slovakia, told NEPSZABADSAG. Weiss participated in the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] weekend congress and also exchanged his views with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs.

Weiss said that Kovacs explained his views on the ratification and the Slovak statement attached to it, and he also informed him of the way the Hungarian Government wishes to exchange the documents. "If I understood it correctly, Points B and C of the Slovak parliamentary decision (namely, the so-called interpretation addendum—Editor's note), as part of the ratification material, are unacceptable for Budapest," Weiss said, adding that there still is a big difference between the two parties regarding the interpretation of the basic treaty, especially in respect of Point 11 of the Council of Europe's Recommendation No. 1201. Weiss stated that if we want the Hungarian Slovak treaty indeed to be the beginning of a positive development

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in bilateral relations, then both interested sides have to show sufficient political will toward this.

In reply to whether the Slovak laws (on the state language and the restructuring of public administration and the recent addition to the penal code on state defense) that have been accepted since the March prime ministerial signing of the treaty have greatly damaged the chances of the basic treaty being implemented, Weiss thought that the European framework agreement on national minority rights might forestall several attempts for misinterpretation. "Unfortunately, apart from Hungary and Slovakia, only one other country has ratified this, although 15 countries would be needed for it to become effective." The SDL accepted the law itself on the state language because it helps to develop the Slovak language, but the SDL sees it as a major deficiency that the law on national minority languages was not approved at the same time. The SDL immediately suggested that until this is done, the current situation should be kept in force regarding the official use of the national minorities' own languages. Parliament rejected this, but to Weiss' question the government said that the law on the use of national minority languages will also be drawn up in the second half of the year. As for the additional rules on state defense, Weiss agreed that these equally threaten the Slovaks and the non-Slovaks. "We also fought against the previous, so-called 'defense of the republic' draft because Slovakia does not need such laws, and we see this as a step backward because, by limiting the freedom of speech and assembly, it creates anti-constitutional conditions." Therefore, if the president returns it and the parliamentary majority again accepts it at the following parliamentary discussion, the opposition—including all from the left-wing to the Hungarians—will appeal to the Constitutional Court.

In summary, Weiss said that if the exchange of the ratification documents is done in order, the basic treaty itself can provide a good opportunity for solving the disputed issues. It was with this in mind that the mechanism—a bilateral committee that can settle our affairs through factual and correct dialogue—for clarifying issues that are seen differently was included in the treaty.

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Hungary: Relations Improve Between Local Troops, IFOR

LD0904165996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] There is a significant improvement, regarding discipline, in the relations between the Hungarian soldiers of Kaposvar and Taszar and the IFOR [Implementation Force] forces stationed in these towns, Brigadier General (Mihaly Cserhalmi), commander of the Kaposvar army unit said at the commanders' meeting this morning.

Although the number of military patrols carried out together with the local police force has hardly diminished compared to 1994, the number of privates who had to be reprimanded last year was halved compared to the year before. The commander of the Kaposvar unit told our radio that relations between the Hungarian units of Kaposvar and Taszar and the peacekeepers were free of conflicts.

Hungary: Kovacs Rejects Romanian Warning of Arms Race

LD0904131696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, specific decisions by NATO about its extension eastward cannot be influenced in any way by the kind of statements made by the Romanian defense minister who said yesterday that a real arms race will begin between Romania and Hungary if Hungary were admitted to NATO before Romania. Attila Kert reports:

[Kert] Hungary's admission into NATO cannot be influenced in any way by [Romanian Defense Minister] Gheorghe Tinca's statement, Laszlo Kovacs told the Midday Chronicle program earlier today, adding that he is virtually certain that the aim of the statement was to improve Romania's chances of admission. [passage omitted]

[Begin Kovacs recording] He who says that one state's admission from this region to NATO may represent a danger to any of its non-NATO neighbors does not understand the principles of NATO. Furthermore, since no decision will be made this year about either EU or NATO admissions, I think that the weighing of chances or the preparation of various hypothetical timetables is meaningless, while sowing panic is definitely harmful. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Hungary: Editorial Assesses Bids To Revive Soviet Union

AU0904151996 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Apr 96 p 7

[Editorial by Zoltan Gyevai: "If Moscow Sneezes...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The slogan according to which they also catch a cold when Moscow sneezes is not a stereotypical phrase for the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The CIS member states are probably mentioning this phrase more frequently these days because of the upcoming presidential elections in Russia. The bitter struggle for the possession of the Kremlin makes its effects felt also in the distant corners of the former empire.

The integration of the former Soviet republics—a process that has been dragging on for the past four years—has suddenly forged ahead. First, the Russian, Belarus, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz presidents signed an agreement stipulating closer economic cooperation than hitherto. A few days later, the two stakhanovs—Moscow and Minsk—went even further when they created the Community of Sovereign Republics. Two other organizations have emerged simultaneously within (along) the CIS. The Russian dailies hasted to compare the interrelated systems to the Matryoshka puppets, puppets that represent integration and which are moved around primarily by Boris Yeltsin. He wants to prove that he alone is capable of again forging the former Soviet republics in a unity, and he can gather good points with the Russian voters with this. Belarus President Lukashenko, who even had to be cooled down in his great zeal to unite, came just at the right moment for Boris Yeltsin. Deepening integration is encouraged not only by the upcoming presidential elections. Traditional economic relations collapsed after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. In many places, the borders cut off raw materials and markets from each other. Reconnecting them seems to be logical. Russia is far more advanced than the other successor states in developing a market economy and in halting inflation. All this makes Russia attractive in the eyes of other CIS members that struggle with problems. But here is the rub too. Ever since they separated, the successor states have been advancing on different economic paths. Russia has restructured its economy, but Belarus has not done so, a country that has now joined Russia. If we look at it from a purely economic viewpoint, Moscow can only lose from this deal, because it will have to finance the Slav brother on the brink of collapse. In exchange, Russia will receive a market of 10 million people, not a huge one in the terms prevailing there. From Russia's viewpoint, this marriage is originally

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motivated by politics rather than money. However, most CIS member states are ready to cooperate for economic reasons and, with the exception of Belarus, losing their political sovereignty is out of the question. Yeltsin is also aware of this. Therefore, after the hysteria connected with the presidential elections, Yeltsin will probably hold the reins if he continues to be Russia's strongman. The integration process could get back into its previous system and continue slowly and with detours, in accordance with the realities. Nobody will talk of the post-Soviet European union like the Russian and Belarus presidents are doing today. In doing this, they forget that it took the organization headquartered in Brussels many long years to create the deep cooperation that the Russian and Belarus presidents only set a few years to achieve. Thus, the comparison involving the European Union will probably become one of Yeltsin's great lines. Because of emerging differences in economic interests, the Russian-Belarus unity might slow down. We should not forget that, before the election campaign, Moscow's position on this issue was considerably reserved. However, one probably will not have to fear the revival of Soviet Union even if a communist president makes it into the Kremlin in June. Genadiy Zhjuganov actually dreams of this. The Duma has abrogated the agreement on the dismantling of the empire. However, a communist president would face the same problems as the ones facing the current president. He would hardly try to forge the dismantled empire together by force.

Of course, it makes a lot of difference to the successor states who sneezes in Moscow. This is how Leonid Kuchma must be thinking too, the Ukrainian president who shows the most moderate enthusiasm toward CIS integration, a person who already voted in favor of Yeltsin and against Zhjuganov. Nor can we exclude the possibility that a Russian-Ukrainian treaty will emerge after all, one that could provide valuable support for Yelsin. As for the unanswered questions that this treaty might leave behind, just like the one with Minsk, who cares about this now! There will be elections soon.

Hungary: Change in Composition of State Creditors Seen

AU0904153696 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 9 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by "L.G.": "Citizens Have Bought More Government Securities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last quarter of 1995, the composition of the government's creditors was restructured. Among the owners of the government securities that were in circulation on 31 December, valued nominally at 1,006.60 billion forints [Ft], the Hungarian National Bank's [MNB] share decreased from 20 percent to 15 percent. The trade banks and specialized financial institutions increased their stock of government securities from Ft258 billion to Ft320 billion, which is presumably due to the significant improvement of their liquidity. The other institutional investors' loans to the government decreased from Ft415 billion to Ft332 billion.

The amount coming from foreign forint investors of government securities more than doubled, increasing from 14 billion to 30 billion forints. Although this plays a small role in the total stock of government securities, the relatively large increase can be attributed to the predictable forint devaluation and the relatively high interest level typical in this period.

The amount of government securities held by the population also increased, from 114 to 131 billion forints. Although we do not yet have the 1996 first quarter data, the Finance Ministry's Center for State Debt Management believes that last year's tendencies have not much changed.

	31 September 1995	31 December 1995
MNB	20.22	15.33
Trade Banks	25.7	32.55
Population	11.4	15.24
Foreigners	1.41	3.12
Institutions	41.27	33.07

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B-H: U.S. 'Partiality' Seen as Obstacle to Peace

AU0904150396 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 96 p 5

[Commentary by Zoran Zuza: "The Dayton Express Derailed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It took 100 days since the signing of the Paris peace accord for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of course the whole euphoria over the almost perfectly smooth implementation of the military section of the Dayton accord, for the analysts who are closely watching events in the region to admit that the peace established between the Serb Republic and the Croatian-Muslim Federation will not be easy to sustain at all. The essence of the problem that the international community is facing has to do with the implementation of the civilian section of the agreement, or precisely the elimination of the basic causes of the civil war in the region.

If we try to answer the question of wherein lie the causes of difficulties in the implementation of the civilian part of the agreement—which, among other things, anticipates the reconstruction and revival of the Serb Republic's and the Muslim-Croatian Federation's economies, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and the conduct of elections on which the future relationship between the entities would depend—the least conclusion we would come to is rather paradoxical: They are to be found in the place where the agreement was reached and promoted—the White House!

Peace "Certain" Until U.S. Elections

As the time anticipated for the implementation of the Dayton accord is inevitably passing, European diplomats, particularly those in charge of the establishment of normal conditions for life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are more and more prone to point to the Clinton administration, alleging that the Dayton peace has been created for the sake of individual interests of powerful protagonists, that is, the election campaign of the current U.S. President. In such rather pessimistic analyses it is assessed that, upon the departure of Implementation Force [IFOR] troops, the tensions of war in this region will not abate, rather they will increase as the time for the departure of military and civilian "peacekeepers" nears.

Without intending to engage in any sort of forecasts, we have to conclude that the Dayton accord has not considerably changed the relations between the State Department and its European allies regarding the former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The anti-Serbian orientation, which is frequently euphemistically termed "partiality," has been most blatantly confirmed by the merciless ethnic cleansing of the Serb parts of Sarajevo (which they called "the transfer of authority"), while many other examples show that the world is not particularly willing to get engaged in the causes of the war in former Yugoslavia, that is, it does not want to admit its own mistakes.

One of the basic mistakes—insisting on a unitary Bosnia, despite the fact that in Dayton two entities were recognized, namely, the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croatian Federation, with their specific borders—will probably cause the peace process to derail, which will most probably not affect the primary U.S. interests in the Balkans and Europe.

What is important at the moment to the aspirant for a new four-year presidential mandate in the White House, Bill Clinton, is to have the time until the U.S. elections pass without incident in Bosnia; or precisely, that nothing happens to U.S. soldiers within the NATO forces. Hence the very strong media campaign launched by Washington, insisting on the departure of the remaining mujahidin from the Muslim army, since the Pentagon is aware that they are the only permanent danger to IFOR soldiers. On the other hand, the Americans are eager to arm and train Izetbegovic's soldiers, knowing that they can always count on them if they happen to need a new Balkan war that would shake the foundations of economically powerful Europe.

In all this one should quite certainly seek the reasons why the Clinton administration has not invested a cent so far in Bildt's fund—which is empty anyway—for the revival of the two entities' economies and the reconstruction of infrastructure and communications in the region.

Impotent Europe

To more and more vociferous protests by Europeans, the Americans have so far answered twice by organizing pompous meetings of the Contact Group in Rome and Geneva. The former, advertised as an impetus for the appeasement of the tense situations in Sarajevo and Mostar, just accelerated the departure of the Sarajevo Serbs and definitely divided the city at the Neretva River. And the latter, a classical example of the U.S. shuttle diplomacy in which only one global boss exists, showed the entire impotence of Europe to withstand U.S. desires and interests. Russia's boycott of the Geneva conference and the subsequent conference in Moscow organized on quite different grounds, in which numerous problems regarding the implementation of the civilian section of the agreement on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina finally moved from a standstill, is a fine example of how all the parties interested in peace in the region are supposed to behave.

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Having understood that by the uneven treatment of the two entities (the Serb Republic was not officially invited either to Rome or to Geneva) concrete problems on the ground cannot be resolved, Russia included Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha in the official Moscow debate. This, in contrast to (deliberately?!) futile U.S. attempts, immediately resulted in concrete arrangements regarding the release of POW's.

Until Moscow, the principle of partiality, even in this issue, used to be much stronger than the Dayton regulations, which, by the way, anticipate an armed intervention by IFOR if detention camps fail to be closed. Instead, in Tuzla, where the greatest number of Serb POW's used to be held, Mrs. Clinton promised financial aid to the Muslim authorities. On the media stage erected on that occasion, packed with flowers and Muslim youth, Admiral Leighton Smith, the unavoidable IFOR commander, was present as well.

Decision in September

Are there any limits in the U.S. games on the hot Balkan ground? Or perhaps, are they really to start only in September, after the U.S. elections [as published], or in December, after the withdrawal of the U.S. soldiers from Bosnia, which is being constantly repeated by the White House? September will be, in any case, the month in which the answers to many questions will most probably be disclosed. Then, not only the Americans but, if everything remains according to plan, the citizens of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croatian Federation will go to the polls. Regardless of all future pressures and blackmail on election procedures, that is, attempts by the Western gunboat diplomacy to impose suitable election candidates, the three ethnic communities in the region will independently decide which way they want to go: Toward the full reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is quite impossible in view of the current relations between the entities and in the Federation itself, or toward the full division of Bosnia, given the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the three peoples, which is anticipated and allowed for even by the Dayton accord itself.

With the hope that the parties in the Serb Republic, after the three and a half year bloody civil war in which our history repeated several times, will not bargain over and gamble away the minimum of national interests, namely, the state of the Serb people, may the one chosen by the people win the elections!

B-H: Bildt Says Serbs 'in Full Compliance' on POW Release

AU1004093896 Paris AFP in English 0927 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 10 (AFP)—Carl Bildt, the top civilian official overseeing the peace process in Bosnia, said Wednesday the Bosnian Serbs would be allowed to attend a major aid donor conference in Brussels this weekend.

Bildt said the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] was in "full compliance and will be invited to the conference" aimed at raising $1.2 billion in aid pledges for the reconstruction of Bosnia.

The former Swedish prime minister, who returned to Sarajevo Tuesday from a trip to Asia and the United States, said he had sent a letter to Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic informing him of the invitation.

"The Republika Srpska side has since yesterday afternoon...been in full compliance with the terms set by my office concerning the release of remaining prisoners," Bildt said.

The release of the last prisoners of war had been set as a condition for attendance at the conference.

The Bosnian Serbs Tuesday released three Moslem prisoners of war and have handed over files on war crimes suspects to the UN war crimes tribunal.

B-H: OIC Meeting on Reconstruction Opens in Sarajevo

AU1004085496 Paris AFP in English 0834 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 10 (AFP)—Foreign ministers and officials of 17 Islamic countries met in the Bosnian capital Wednesday to discuss the contribution of the Islamic world to the reconstruction of this war-shattered country.

The meeting of the enlarged contact group of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) started at 0800 GMT and was to hear an opening address by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.

Hamid al-Gabid, the Secretary-General of the OIC met Izetbegovic Tuesday and discussed ways the Islamic world could "contribute to the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Al-Gabid said in a statement here.

The two men "stressed the necessity for a more substantial contribution on the part of the countries invited to" a crucial conference of donor countries due to meet in Brussels Friday and Saturday, he added.

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The Bosnian government estimates the cost of the physical destruction and damage to buildings alone in Bosnia's three and a half year war at more than $80 billion.

The World Bank estimates Bosnia's immediate rebuilding needs over the next three years at $5.1 billion and hopes to raise $1.8 billion in pledges this year.

The Bank, co-organiser with the European Union of the Bosnian reconstruction conference, is keenly awaiting news of hard pledges of cash from the richer members of the Islamic community to the cost of Bosnia's reconstruction, an official said this weekend.

So far, potential contributors to the conference have been cagey in making cash offers to Bosnia.

Representatives of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates were attending the OIC meeting in Sarajevo, the first ever such gathering of leaders of the Islamic world in the Bosnian capital.

Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali-Akbar Velyati was due to set out Iran's contribution at a press conference around midday. He held talks with Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic after his arrival Tuesday.

B-H: Izetbegovic Thanks OIC Ministerial Meeting for Aid

AU1004111496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have reported, the ministerial summit of the [word indistinct] contact group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] for Bosnia-Herzegovina opened in Sarajevo today, at which they are discussing the implementation of the Dayton peace accord and the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ministers and heads of delegations of the 15 countries participating in this meeting were, at the start of the meeting, addressed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. Senada Cumurovic reports:

[Begin Cumurovic recording] At the start of the ministerial meeting, the OIC chairman, Guinean Foreign Minister (?Dominique) said:

[(?Dominique)] I am glad that we came to Sarajevo where we have had the opportunity to see the scale of devastation in this town. Here, we will hear from our friends what we should do in our support.

[Cumurovic] [Words indistinct] Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, who [words indistinct] this gathering. This is the first meeting at this level, Dr. Muratovic said, expressing thanks for the constant support of the Islamic countries to Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout the difficult times.

Afterwards, the meeting was addressed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, who, at the beginning, voiced his satisfaction with the fact that this meeting was being held in Sarajevo. We will use today's meeting to present to you the situation in our country and ask you for further political and economic aid, President Izetbegovic said, adding that, after the departure of the Implementation Force, one of the decisive factors of stability will be the equipment of a smallish, but well-trained army. We expect a portion of aid in this important task from the Islamic countries. The economic aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina's reconstruction should be on an international and long-term basis. We cannot carry out this important task by ourselves, we need your assistance. Our people know, Izetbegovic said, how much the Islamic countries have helped us during the fighting for freedom, and we are deeply grateful to you for it. Thanks to this aid, we defended and preserved the state, which is the precondition for our survival. These were the words of Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency, in his address.

An agreement on the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Guinea will be signed at noon. A declaration from this gathering will also be published today. [end recording]

B-H: Izetbegovic Appeals for Islamic Military, Economic Aid

AU1004115296 Paris AFP in English 1109 GMT 10 Apr 96

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, April 10 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic on Wednesday appealed for military and economic aid from the Islamic world ahead of a key conference on the reconstruction of this war-ravaged state.

Speaking at the opening of a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference [OIC] contact group here, Izetbegovic urged the Islamic world to come through on promises of military aid and pledge economic assistance at a meeting in Brussels this weekend.

Izetbegovic said he had not been satisfied with the outcome of a first donors conference in December when only $600 million in pledges was raised.

He also called for "help from Islamic countries in equipping our army and in economic aid for reconstruction."

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Speaking in Sarajevo, Carl Bildt, the top civilian official overseeing the Bosnian peace process said he hoped the OIC meeting in Sarajevo would produce a "substantial contribution" to Bosnia's recovery.

"I very much hope that...the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) is able to come up with a substantial contribution from the Islamic countries for the reconstruction conference in Brussels," he said.

Hamid al-Gabid, the Secretary-General of the OIC said Tuesday the "historic and symbolic" meeting in Sarajevo would decide how the Islamic world could "contribute to the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina." [passage omitted]

Representatives of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates were attending the OIC meeting in Sarajevo, the first ever such gathering of leaders of the Islamic world in the Bosnian capital.

Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati was due to set out Iran's contribution at a press conference around midday.

The meeting here was due to end around 1400 GMT with a press conference to announce the aid to be given by Islamic countries.

B-H: Izetbegovic, Muratovic Meet With Iran's Velayati

LD1004081796 Tehran IRNA in English 0642 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 10, IRNA—Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the latest developments in Bosnia and the Balkans, as well as Tehran-Sarajevo ties in separate meetings Tuesday [9 April] with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic.

Izetbegovic praised Iran's all-out assistance and support during the Bosnian war and Tehran's unstinting efforts in the international arena to restore the legitimate rights of the Bosnian people.

He also termed as valuable Iran's attempts, as a member of the Islamic community, in defending the rights of the Bosnian people. He asked that these efforts be continued now that Bosnia is undergoing reconstruction.

The Bosnian president also expressed satisfaction with the deep and strong ties that existed between the two nations during the Balkan crisis, and stressed on expanding bilateral relations and mutual cooperation during peacetime.

Velayati who arrived here on Tuesday to attend the two-day ministerial meeting of the Contact Group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), underlined Iran's readiness to actively participate in Bosnian reconstruction efforts.

Turning to the OIC meeting, the Iranian foreign minister expressed hope that Islamic countries would also earnestly take part in the development efforts of Bosnia.

He termed the ties between Iran and Bosnia as deep and unbreakable, emphasizing that cooperation should be bolstered in all fields.

In another development, Foreign Minister Velayati discussed with Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic promotion of Tehran-Sarajevo ties and a more active participation of Islamic countries in Bosnian reconstruction efforts.

The Bosnian prime minister described Iran's role within the OIC activities in support of giving assistance to Bosnia as dynamic and important.

He also called for serious and active participation of Islamic countries in Bosnian reconstruction efforts.

Expressing satisfaction with his recent visit to Tehran, Muratovic termed ties between the two countries as friendly and close and called for bolstering of cooperation in all fields.

Turning to Iran's experiences in post-war reconstruction, the Bosnian prime minister called for making use of these experiences in resolving Bosnian problems.

Velayati said that Iran will have an active presence in the current meeting of the OIC Contact Group and voiced Tehran's readiness to provide Sarajevo with its assistance and experiences of the post-war reconstruction era.

Turning to the positive results of Muratovic's recent visit to Tehran, Velayati welcomed formulating of Tehran-Sarajevo cooperation within the framework of a suitable plan.

Velayati on behalf of First Vice-President Hasan Habibi invited Muratovic to attend the inaugural ceremony of the Mahshad-Sarakhs-Tajan railway.

B-H: Weekly Views Izetbegovic's Political Position

AU1004121596 Ljubljana SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 96 p 9

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Fatal Delay"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic's latest interview for the national newspaper LJILJAN must have been a shocking political refreshment for all those who follow his public

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remarks. Izetbegovic spoke to his close friend and SDA [Party of Democratic Action] ideologist Dzemaludin Latic, and the dialogue looked more like a family quarrel rather than a discussion between two individuals who had, until recently, thought alike. In this dialogue, Izetbegovic, almost excitedly, opposed a stereotype opinion, according to which the entire world has turned against Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniaks. He emphasized that mistakes were also made at home.

He mentioned the media, which is competing to prove the fact that a multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina is not possible, and, in this context, named the aforementioned newspaper. He admitted that the existence of a training base at Fojnica even after the signing of the Dayton agreement was a "great mistake." Noticing that a question included the idea of the United States being the enemy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic almost snapped the following question at Latic: "Let me ask you something. Will Bosnia-Herzegovina be safer if we establish that the United States, as well as about 10 other more important states, are all enemies? I do not think that the United States is our enemy, but we can make it be.... Iran has proven to be a true friend during the war. However, Iran is far away, but the enemy is close."

Analysis of this remark, as well as some of President Izetbegovic's last remarks, points to the conclusion that there has been a change in his political tactics. This change has been forced by a gloomy view of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation in the ruling party, and new pressures from the United States, which believes that Izetbegovic has been enjoying its indulgence [popust] for a long time.

Izetbegovic is probably aware that he cannot do much for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is too late for such a feat, even if it would depend only on his will and his capability. On the other hand, what legacy he leaves behind is not without importance to him. During his hospital stay, he turned to the public on two occasions. On State Day, he appealed to the people to be "less Bosniak, Croat, Serb, Jewish,...in the future and more citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Izetbegovic sees a method to heal the wounds made by this war in a symbiosis of the national and native identity. A repeat of the tragedy would thus also be avoided.

In better times, when no one had an idea of what was lurking in the background, such a message would have the true value of a political manifesto. However, the message has arrived with a fatal delay. Its useful value can only be spoken of in context of the forthcoming elections. Today, Izetbegovic has serious problems with his own political philosophy, which is an amalgam of the religious and the national. The SDA has been considered a political-religious movement from the start, and credit for that undoubtedly goes to Izetbegovic. At the time when the Bosniak people already had a knife at their throat, such an orientation did have a practical meaning, but it has since become harmful. The SDA functions like a conservative party with religion for its ideology. This objectively excludes it from the group of modern European parties. However, the main problem is in its inappropriate policy, which is, on the surface, often seen as pure amateurism. It is not exactly known what the difference between its state [drzavotvorni] and political program is. If the two do exist, they are basically conflicting.

Izetbegovic knows that a political restoration of the party is necessary. However, he is not certain as to how far he can go with it. The party's compass is still in his hands. However, does a change in the party's course not also represent a risk for him? There are also other problems. The latest evaluations show that the break with [former Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister] Haris Silajdzic could be more dangerous than it first seemed. Silajdzic is criticizing his former party more and more severely. He does this regarding the misuse of religion for political purposes, which is the explicit platform of the SDA's extreme wing. The complication that arose when they separated has become paradoxical, because one has the feeling that Izetbegovic and Silajdzic are basically still similar.... If Izetbegovic enters into an open confrontation with the extremists of the political-religious provenance that dangerously complicates the Bosniaks' position in Western eyes, it will mean that he intends to liberalize his own party. At the same time, it will also mean that he wants to amortize the consequences of the separation between him and the former prime minister, who was also his right-hand man. His fear that the liberal wing of the SDA might shift to Silajdzic's new party is not without reason. Domestic circumstances, as well as circumstances outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, are shortening the time that Izetbegovic has in order to clarify his actual intentions. This is a new moment for all those who are trying to answer the following question: Is Bosnia-Herzegovina moving toward integration or is its break up on the horizon?

B-H: Ganic Addresses Assembly on Dayton Progress

AU0904185496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1521 GMT 9 Apr 96

[Address by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, to the 18th session of the

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Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [passage indistinct] It is true that coexistence [words indistinct] but its only chance for survival [words indistinct]. [Words indistinct] and the right to a normal life. Peace has made up for all of the Dayton accord's unfavorable points, and reason has been given a chance in Bosnia [words indistinct]. Dayton's forte is the Implementation Force's [IFOR] decisive stance to be [words indistinct]. The Dayton peace is certainly not a just peace, but [words indistinct]. (?The most significant goals) of peace are the integrity and statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the return of all refugees to their homes, [words indistinct] and punishment of all war criminals. I wish to convince you that [words indistinct] of the international community, the realization of these goals will to a great extent depend on us. We need to contribute to this [words indistinct]. The Dayton accord has been [words indistinct] to keep your attention, to be short and clear [words indistinct], but as you can see, the very act of listing the accompanying documents [words indistinct]. On the other hand, I am certain that you are acquainted with the course of all these activities, which makes my address easier and allows me to skip certain generally known things. I hope that the ensuing debate will be more interesting than my address. All the experts and participants in the Dayton accord are here and they will answer your questions; that is, [words indistinct].

Ladies and gentlemen, there is general consent in the international community and in Bosnia-Herzegovina that real results have been achieved in the implementation of the military part of the peace agreement, but the civilian implementation has yielded far more modest results. [Words indistinct] of carrying out tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the realization of obligations which the international community has toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following the successful operation of establishing peace and separating forces, IFOR should extend greater help to the civilian implementation of the peace agreement. This primarily concerns the creation of safe conditions for the return of refugees, help with reconstructing the infrastructure, free movement of people and goods throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the establishment of trust. We cannot be satisfied with:

First, the international community's delay in helping the implementation of the civilian part of the agreement, which calls into question the r lization of the peace agreement's essential points. This particularly pertains to the delay and [word indistinct] of economic aid for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and our totally devastated economy. Moreover, this is reflected in the return of refugees and displaced persons and the demobilization of a great number of troops and their employment. Such a violation of economic aid could cause [word indistinct] (?pensions) and unforeseeable consequences for the political stabilization and preservation of peace.

Second, on the establishment of (?return projects), the answer will be provided by the UNHCR, and after four months—since the signing of the peace agreement—it is not being implemented at a desired pace [words indistinct]. We are cooperating at the necessary level with the Bosnian Government, as well as with authorities of the entity, including regional and local authorities. The authorities of the Serb entity publicly oppose the implementation of the (?provisions) on the return [words indistinct]. The return to Federation territories is being implemented with great difficulties [words indistinct] and return programs have been agreed [words indistinct] in cooperation with the UNHCR and the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation [words indistinct].

Third, relatively little time remains until the elections [words indistinct] in September. Joint domestic political structures and the relevant authorities should increase their efforts to implement certain parts of the peace process.

Fourth, the international community has failed to apply the appropriate pressure to help establish democracy in the Serb entity and achieve a willingness to cooperate within [words indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Transitional bodies of authority still have not been established in the Serb entity, and representatives of the non-Serb population and other political parties have not been included in politics in accordance with the results of past elections [words indistinct]. Meanwhile, the international community has still not found a way to apply pressure on the Serb entity in order to [words indistinct].

Fifth, a number of institutions anticipated by the peace accord have not been formed yet, while others were established only after a long delay. This particularly refers to institutions for cooperation between the Serb entity and the Federation [words indistinct], for protection of human rights, commissions for refugees and displaced persons, protection of national monuments and [words indistinct]. The international community has not found a way to prevent a systematic [words indistinct] of (?property).

Sixth, we are very concerned about and embittered by the attempts to disregard war crimes in a perfidious way, relativize mass graves, share the responsibility, and equate the victim and the aggressor. To leave mass graves unexamined is a morbid attempt to divide Bosnia. Furthermore, to leave them unexamined is an

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attempt [words indistinct]. Mass graves—let me say this openly—is a shame on (?Europe's idea of moral values), which did not want to stop the (?bloodshed). [Words indistinct] of Bosniaks [words indistinct].

Seventh, participation by the Federation Assembly—let me put this diplomatically—is insufficient. Both assemblies, especially the federation one, should establish to what extent the Federation is really present, [words indistinct], in municipalities and cantons, but above all in every place that has sent a deputy to the Federation Assembly. Unfortunately, we do not see many deputies from [word indistinct] people. The Dayton agreement is not only in the interest of the Bosniaks. It seems that the entire burden has fallen on the Federation president and vice president. These two are not enough, even if both of them fully perform their jobs. [Words indistinct] if all of us, at least in the state structures, are not on the same side, especially regarding the commitments that we jointly signed in Dayton and [word indistinct].

Let me now say something about the military aspects of the peace accord—namely, Annexes 1-a and 1-b, which I am sure you have analyzed. The Bosnian Army is carrying out all the commitments anticipated by Annex 1-a. These commitments refer to deadlines and are subject to IFOR control. Thus, up to (?D+30)], it has been done [words indistinct] forces on the territory controlled by the Bosnian Army have been disbanded, disarmed, and have left the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since 9 January, there have been no advisors, instructors, volunteers, or personnel from other states in the army units. I have always considered the role of these people, no matter how many of them there were, to be (?straightforward) and (?unique).

Second, all units of the Bosnian Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] have withdrawn from the exclusion zone. [Words indistinct] and they have been marked. The Bosnian Army has submitted POW lists to the authorities and [words indistinct] to canton authorities. In the region under Karadzic's control, there are 30,000 soldiers from the so-called republic of Serb Krajina. Despite our warnings, IFOR has not reacted to the presence of these foreign [words indistinct]. IFOR is not reacting because it is not being attacked and the soldiers do not represent any danger. They will not endanger the peace until IFOR leaves.

Regarding D+45, the Bosnian Army and the HVO have withdrawn from locations reverted to the other entity, thus fully realizing their commitments. In this phase of implementation, there have not been any considerable difficulties or problems.

The following was realized by day D+90:

—plans were submitted for entering areas that were integrated into the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All Anti-Air Defense systems were collected in four locations authorized by IFOR. The Army removed all stationary checkpoints, and mine-clearing operations were agreed with IFOR. Problems cropped up in this period, namely, demarcation lines in Sarajevo were interpreted differently from the demarcation lines separating the entities; moreover, the HVO demanded access to the barracks in Vucile and Blazuj, which delayed and made difficult the deployment of 1st Corps units and commands. As far as the Army is concerned, we can conclude that key tasks have been implemented:

—conflicts have been stopped;
—foreign citizens have departed;
—units have been deployed outside the separation zones on the territory of the Federation;
—anti-air-defense systems have been collected;
—locations established for accommodating units during withdrawal;
—freedom of movement has been increased;

The implementation of the military part of the peace agreement is therefore proceeding in an organized manner and according to plan. Cooperation with IFOR is mostly good. A great number of troops will be demobilized by D+120, and the manpower will be accommodated in appointed locations. Nonetheless, the problem of accommodating manpower and equipment will continue to be a problem, as will the social status and position of Army members and demobilized troops, and the establishment of the Federal Army.

Talks on the building of trust and security have ended in Vienna, teams have been formed for armament inspection and control, and negotiations are in progress in Vienna on measures for subregional armament control, which should end by (?26) June 1996. There are problems regarding the limit because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not submit accurate figures of its armaments at the beginning of the negotiations.

Allow me to say something about annex 2; you are aware that there are many of these annexes. Annex 2 pertains to demarcation between the entities. From 21 February to 20 March 1996, the Interior Ministry of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina implemented the tasks according to the plan for the reintegration of federal areas, pertaining primarily to Sarajevo suburbs. The process of reintegration took place in very complex security conditions, and we need to stress that first degree crimes like homicide, rape, robbery, and so forth were not reported. In the first couple of days we did have cases of robbery committed by persons who came to the area individually. Household appliances, building

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material, and similar items were taken from abandoned houses and other buildings. Five suits for serious crimes were filed against the perpetrators, another 160 robbery suits were filed, and a great number of misdemeanor suits. Twelve individuals were taken into custody.

There would have been a significantly lesser number of crimes had the international community allowed a greater number of our police officers to enter the areas in question. So far, we have discovered 12 mass graves in Hadzici, Vogosca, and Ilijas [words indistinct] which contain Bosniaks and Croats who [words indistinct].

The large number of remaining mines and booby traps are a particular problem. Some 7,000 mines have been found, and around 5,000 kg of explosives, as well as large amounts of artillery and infantry ammunition. Despite constant warnings issued to citizens not to come to areas and buildings that have not been checked, we have recorded 13 cases of mine detonations which killed three, and seriously wounded seven people. Police members are fully and successfully cooperating with members of the international police, particularly [words indistinct] and other tasks stipulated by the agreement. The citizens in local communities and municipalities are particularly contributing to the establishment of a favorable security situation.

Following the reintegration of Sarajevo suburbs, we made a comprehensive assessment of the situation, primarily as regards housing, the infrastructure, and industrial facilities. The task requires more efficiency. Key infrastructure facilities [word indistinct] under IFOR protection were destroyed, damaged, and robbed. IFOR protected what it deemed indispensable for its own purposes. This includes certain hotels in Ilidza, the Bacevo spring, and so forth. Apartments and houses are practically of no use. When leaving, the local Serbs loyal to Karadzic thoroughly plundered the apartments and houses which they had previously inhabited. Time and significant funds will be needed to rebuild them. That is why it is not possible to initiate a comprehensive project of repatriation in the areas that would proceed at the anticipated speed [words indistinct].

The greatest degree of damage is on industrial facilities that were systematically plundered and torched. The extent of destruction is greater in areas that were reintegrated later, so that there is not a single industrial facility in Hadzici, Ilidza, and Novo Sarajevo that has not been torched. The reconstruction of all facilities and the revival of production in them—irrespective of the program—will [words indistinct] in the foreseeable future.

[Word indistinct] after the peace agreement went into force, the Federation and the Serb entity should each have appointed one member to the arbitration committee for the demarcation in the controversial Brcko area. In the event that the two sides fail to agree in a period of 30 days, the International Court of Justice in The Hague will appoint a third committee member. Some two months remain until the deadline, and the arbitration committee has still not been appointed. The Serb entity is attempting to prejudge the arbitration decision through unilateral and unauthorized relocation of population and its settlement in the controversial Brcko area. The Geneva document dated 18 March 1996 warns of the illegal and inadmissible aspect of this activity. The international community, with IFOR's help, should find other ways of preventing the relocation of the population to the controversial area.

On the other hand, the federal government and other state bodies will take all necessary measures to prepare valid documentation for making a just decision regarding Brcko. The negotiations regarding the coordination of stances pertaining to areas in municipalities where the demarcation lines are causing problems and misunderstandings have entered the final phase, particularly as regards Bosanska Krupa and the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja.

Allow me to say something [word indistinct] Annex 3 of the Dayton Accord. The elections are one of the most important elements in the civilian part of the peace agreement. Free, fair, and democratic elections should lay the foundations for a (?representational) system and secure a progressive achievement of democratic goals throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with relevant OSCE documents. An (?interim) election commission [word indistinct] OSCE [words indistinct] I appeal for a little more patience.

[Words indistinct] has drafted two documents: one, criteria for the elections, and two, interim electoral [word indistinct]. By the end of the month, the commission will adopt definite regulations for the registration of political parties and independent candidates, the registration of voters, the media's role, the role of domestic and international observers, and other issues pertaining to the electoral process. [Words indistinct] It is certain that [words indistinct] in the areas where they had residency in 1991 so as to annul the effects of expulsion in the electoral process. In this way, effects of ethnic cleansing will be annulled.

Second, the voting method, that is, the representational system, is very important because it will allow the maximum number of parties to be represented in the future assembly. That is particularly important for those of you who [words indistinct].

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Third, the registration of political parties and independent deputies. This is a very important issue. We are particularly concerned over the fact that there have been no major steps forward in creating conditions for democratic elections in the Serb entity. [Words indistinct] six-month election period, we should already have freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of media, and freedom of political parties to implement their political goals throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the return of refugees and displaced persons should already have started as this has been clearly marked as a prerequisite for democratic elections in Annex 3 of the Dayton Accord.

It is the interim electoral commission's task to see whether the prerequisites for elections exist; we are tired of the equalizing of all sides. If it is not established within a set deadline who is not honoring their obligations, and if that party is not pressured—including imposing sanctions—the organization in charge of elections will not be able to give the green light for [words indistinct] in June. This will call into question not only the September elections, but also the entire peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. We would like to once more clearly reiterate that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a signatory of the agreement, is completely ready to meet all prerequisites for democratic elections. We want democratic elections at a European level, and not an electoral scam that is being organized by Karadzic and Mladic. Our message to Bildt and Frowick is that there can be no real elections as long as war criminals are at the helm of the Serb entity. As far as the common man is concerned, IFOR will only be neutral once it delivers Karadzic and Mladic, and other war criminals, to The Hague. The international community needs to be helped to think rationally. It is spending billions of dollars on IFOR and the UN Protection Force, instead of investing at least a small part of these funds in the The Hague's Tribunal efficient work, which is crucial for the annihilation of the virus of revived fascism and nationalism. Once this is done, real peace can be established in the region.

At the time, the Nuremberg trials annihilated Nazism from Western Europe; 50 years later it moved to our areas, and I'm afraid that it will continue to spread eastward. If IFOR arrests Karadzic and Mladic, then its mandate here will really be [words indistinct]. If, however, IFOR fails to do this, as long as the two [Karadzic and Mladic] are in power, IFOR [words indistinct] Bosniak bones from mass graves [words indistinct].

We demand that Carl Bildt shows decisiveness in looking for other collocutors in the Serb entity, and not talk to war criminals and their henchmen, because this only encourages them to [words indistinct]. Deputies from various parties will probably address this issue more extensively during the debate. I have to express satisfaction with the fact that the interim electoral commission has established cooperation with all political parties in (?the assembly), and has thus made it possible for this extremely important section of the peace agreement to be implemented throughout [words indistinct]. I personally believe that there should be even tighter cooperation between political parties and the commission [words indistinct]. This is a guarantee for free, democratic elections to be carried out properly throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will in turn confirm the sovereignty and [word indistinct] of (?the democratic option).

We come gradually to the end. Annex 4, or the Constitutional Organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina affirms the state's sovereignty, international [word indistinct], and political independence. Internal organization is founded on the highest international standards on human rights and liberties and the establishment of democratic institutions including political realities [word indistinct] to use all advantages of regional development and local self-administration. (?Democracy), the constitutional structure, and human rights express and respect the multinational structure [words indistinct] national equality in decisionmaking at the state and federal level.

The Forum for the Federation was formed a few days ago, and it opens the possibility of greater involvement of U.S. diplomacy in implementing the Federal Constitution and stabilizing the situation in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Allow me to say something about relations with neighboring states. First, Bosnia-Herzegovina's relations with the Republic of Croatia. The peace agreement has given a fresh impetus for the establishment of firm, neighborly relations between the two states. [Words indistinct] resulting in the signing of a large number of agreements that will enable cooperation in these fields [words indistinct]. The quality of these agreements will [words indistinct].

Bosnia-Herzegovina's relations with the FRY. The two states have recognized each other as sovereign states within internationally recognized borders. The same agreement obliges them to establish diplomatic ties and normalize relations. Contact established heretofore regarding an exchange of ambassadors and normalization of relations has not yielded results because the FRY has set unacceptable conditions, namely, a demand for the withdrawal of the suit Bosnia-Herzegovina filed with the International Court against Serbia and Montenegro

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for genocide [words indistinct] as well as an interest in developing economic cooperation, establishing communications, and a readiness to resolve consular issues. In spite of this, the FRY continues to make the normalization of relations contingent on the above and other conditions. The FRY has committed itself to implementing the agreement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. In this case, the international community is not employing all available measures to pressure the FRY into honoring the obligation.

Annex 5 pertains to human rights protection. Aggression and genocide in Bosnia constitute the greatest possible violation of human rights. That is why the constitutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation and particularly Annex (?6) have adopted the highest international standards of human rights and liberties, and Bosnia-Herzegovina's legal organization [word indistinct] all relevant international legal documents on the protection of human rights and liberties. The peace agreement and these international legal documents envisage various domestic and international instruments for human rights protection, namely, a human rights commission, ombudsmen [words indistinct] human rights in the Federation, and so forth.

The implementation of these institutions and documents is overdue. Annex 7—the painful issue—pertains to the return of refugees and (?displaced persons). Over 2 million refugees and displaced persons, 2 million fates, represent the most tragic consequence of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. The principle to have them all return to their homes with guarantees for their private property and restitution for their losses is a crucial point of the peace agreement. There can be no peace in the Balkans without the return of people to their homes. Return to all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina is also a crucial condition for reintegration. Dayton has not provided the answer to several issues that pertain to the creation of conditions for the repatriation of displaced persons and refugees.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government (?believes it necessary) to adopt a separate document [words indistinct] principles and stances [words indistinct] provide an answer to several issues that pertain to the implementation of the agreement on the return of displaced persons and refugees. Regarding this, the Ministry for Refugees has drafted stances and principles that have been coordinated with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and incorporated into the comprehensive repatriation plan recently presented in Geneva.

Activities have continued on the implementation and adoption of an agreement on the repatriation of refugees and the definition of the type of assistance to be provided by the host country in the repatriation process and creation of conditions for return. These activities are part of the multilateral and bilateral negotiations that are being conducted at government level between our country and the host country [words indistinct].

Contact has been established with Austria, Hungary, Switzerland [words indistinct] and Croatia [words indistinct]. The negotiations have yielded satisfactory results [words indistinct] signing of the repatriation agreement as an aspect of concrete help and the creation of conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons. We have established contact and initiated cooperation with international institutions with a view to stimulating refugees to return and facilitating their reintegration into society, and with a view to creating the conditions for their return; possibilities have also been created for refugees to exercise their right to customs privileges. In cooperation with the Foreign Ministry, we have drafted instructions listing the conditions and ways for exercising this right. Each one of you, gentlemen, [words indistinct] is expected to tell refugees—many of whom were instrumental in your election—what you have accomplished and what you plan to accomplish in the future. A commission for refugees and displaced persons pursuant to Annex 4 and Annex 7 has been established.

Various bodies and institutions, including numerous Bosnian nongovernmental organizations, have various obligations and responsibilities in the implementation of the civilian aspect of peace implementation. This makes necessary [word indistinct] a comprehensive coordination of Bosnia-Herzegovina's civilian structures in the implementation of the peace agreement.

Finally, allow me to remind you that a commission has been formed for the protection of the national heritage of all peoples living on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the results of the commission's work will contribute to the reconstruction of our destroyed cultural, historical, and natural heritage.

Ladies and gentlemen, this agreement is a comprehensive document, and I have attempted to give a brief review of it. I hope that you have read the agreement carefully, however, judging by some of your questions, I see that you need to go back and reread it [words indistinct]. At the end of this address, instead of conclusions and big words, I would like to add a personal and [word indistinct] note.

A few days ago, at the celebration marking Passover, the great Jewish holiday, the Sarajevo that has (?resisted) divisions and [words indistinct] was seated at the table in the Jewish Municipality. The Jews of Sarajevo, wise, hardworking, and rational citizens who can choose the

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place on the planet where they wish to live, have returned to their [words indistinct]. Thank you.

B-H: Ganic Interviewed on Muslims' Situation, Elections

NC0904201596 Cairo MENA in English 1715 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Manama, 9 Apr (MENA)—Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic has termed as "long-standing and distinguished", the brotherly relationship between Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In an exclusive interview with MENA, he urged for boosting bilateral ties through intensifying joint contacts and cooperation in all fields.

Bosnia's reconstruction process has already started but at a very slow pace due to the shortage in financing, Ganic said.

He revealed that the international financial assistance that has already been extended to Bosnia is very meager compared to the billions needed for the country's reconstruction. Ganic voiced hope that the situation will change after the convocation of the donor countries' conference in Brussels on Thursday [11 April] and Friday.

Political conditions in Bosnia are highly complicated, Ganic said. However, he added, the military part of Dayton peace agreement is being effected satisfactorily.

There are several problems hampering the implementation of the civil part of the agreement on top of which, the continued presence of war criminals such as Radovan Karadic and the failure to depose them and bring them to trial as the agreement dictates, he said.

The peace process cannot move forward nor can the elections slated for this summer, with the presence of those butchers, he said.

The war criminals should be brought to trial before the International Court of Justice, if the international community is really keen on implementing the peace agreement, he said.

The Bosnian vice president termed as "inadequate" international efforts to arrest and try the war criminals. He wondered whether this laxity in trying the war criminals is because the victims, the more than 200,000 who were killed and the thousands of women who were systematically raped, were all Muslims.

Would Europe and the international community have taken such a languid stand if those crimes were committed against non-Muslims, he rhetorically asked. He voiced hope that the international community's stance would change and that the murderers would be brought to trial. Europe's future stand regarding the Muslims of Bosnia will depend this, he said.

On the future of the Bosnian-Croat federation Ganic said that the federation is a must for the sake of survival. It is a sort of a marriage of interests, he said.

The federation is necessary for both sides, he said noting Croatia's eagerness to join new European trends and Bosnia's to succeed in its reconstruction programs. Only the future will tell about the strength of this federation and its ability to last, he said.

On the elections which will be held in Bosnia before the end of this summer and the Muslims' preparedness for these elections, Ganic said he cannot predict anything at present.

Many new Bosnian Muslim parties have emerged and it is obvious that they are planning to take part in the elections, he said.

He warned of continued foreign attempts to undermine the Bosnian Muslims' unity in the elections by scattering Muslim votes an too many parties, especially as the Croats and Serbs will be represented in the elections by one party each. What is going on among the Bosnian Muslims is a part of a conspiracy to minimize the powers of President Alija Izetbegovic.

Asked about Bosnia's relation with the Islamic world, the Bosnian vice president said that Bosnia is a test balloon which shows the extent of the Islamic countries keenness on protecting Muslims from being uprooted from this important spot in central Europe.

The Islamic countries should ask themselves how to protect the Bosnian Muslims who defended their country against aggression, steadfastly and with strong faith, he said.

Bosnia needs both spiritual and material support to help it survive, he said. Bosnia's survival and strength should be an honor to the Islamic nation, he said, intimating that a strong Islamic stand regarding Bosnia would have a very positive effect on Europe.

Ganic said that the Bosnian president is recovering from a recent illness and that he is getting ready to resume his full responsibilities.

B-H: Croatian War Crimes Suspect Denies Accusations

AU0904174396 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1600 GMT 9 Apr 96

[Report by Fritz Pesata]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Bosnian Croat Zdravko Mucic, who was arrested in Vienna on 18 March, was

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extradited to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague this morning. Together with other Bosnians, Mucic is accused of participating in war crimes against Serbs in Herzegovina. [passage omitted] Mucic denies any involvement in the war crimes of which he is accused. According to his Vienna lawyer, he has stated that, as a commander of the Zelebic prison camp, he wanted to help his Serb compatriots and protected many of them from maltreatment and death. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb 'Extremists' Desecrate Croat Cemetery

LD0904181996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Serb extremists have desecrated a Croat cemetery in Krepsic, having first prevented Croat refugees from that village in the Brcko municipality from visiting the graves of their relatives. Mario Ivkic has a report:

[Ivkic] Only a few hours after Serb Republic police from Brcko had prevented Croat refugees from the Ravne-Brcko municipality from paying a visit to the occupied Croat villages of Krepsic and Ivaniste which had been properly agreed and organized earlier, a gruesome barbaric act took place in one of these villages. During the night of 8-9 April, Serb extremists desecrated and devastated about 80 percent of the tombstones in the local Catholic cemetery in the village of Krepsic. We learned this from eyewitnesses who managed to reach this village in their personal vehicles.

According to statements by Serb civilians who prevented the visit to the occupied Croatian villages of Krepsic and Ivaniste, the local population believes that the perpetrators are disorderly Serb refugees from Sarajevo aided by local Serb extremists. [passage omitted]

B-H: UNHCR: Conditions for Refugee Return Still Not Met

LD0904173796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1626 GMT 9 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, April 9 (TANJUG)—Essential conditions have still not been met for the mass return of refugees and displaced persons to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the spokesman of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] Ron Redmond told TANJUG on Tuesday [9 April].

Redmond said there was still no freedom of movement in Bosnia, housing facilities were modest, houses and flats were repaired very slowly, the area had still not been cleared of mines, all of which made the organisation of a mass return of refugees and displaced persons more diffuclt.

He said that 50,000 people, mostly displaced persons, had returned to their homes so far. Out of this figure 30,000 are Serbs who returned to Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, in western Bosnia, from the Banja Luka area.

The two towns had been occupied by Bosnian Croat and regular Croatian army trooops since autumn last year and have been returned to the Serbs several weeks ago under the terms of the Dayton accords.

Redmond added that around 10,000 Muslims returned to the Velika Kladusa area in northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

They are supporters of moderate Muslim politician Fikret Abdic who fled the area ahead of last year's offensive launched jointly by central Muslim authorities of Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian Croats and regular Croatian army troops.

Following the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in November last year UNHCR launched a three-phase plan for the repatriation of over two million refugees and displaced persons in January.

Redmond said, however, this was only a plan, or a goal the UNHCR has set, which will be very hard to achieve considering the present circumstances.

B-H: Bosnian Serbs File Charges Against NATO Leaders

LD1004120396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1018 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 10 Apr (SRNA)—The Association of Serb Camp Inmates from 1991 has filed criminal charges before The Hague tribunal against NATO leaders and UN representatives due to the killing of Radmila Galinac and Radenko Galinac during air strikes on Semizovac-Srednje road, near Sarajevo, on 9 September 1995.

The association has taken this step on the basis of authorization given by Radmila's and Radenko's father Marko.

The charges refer to Willy Claes, then NATO secretary general; General George Joulwan, NATO commander for Europe; Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of Allied Force South; and Yasushi Akashi, Bernard Janvier, and Rupert Smith, former UN representatives for former Yugoslavia.

Crimes against the civilian population were committed in the abovementioned case, which under Article Five of

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the statute of the Hague Tribunal, are considered crimes against humanity.

The association offered video evidence and other documents in connection with these crimes to The Hague tribunal experts.

B-H: IFOR Spokesman on 'Additional Measures' in Bosnia

LD0904201796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1733 GMT 9 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Apr 9 (TANJUG)—IFOR Spokesman Andrew Cumming said Tuesday [9 April] in Pale, the administrative centre of the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska (RS) [Serb Republic], that the Implementation Force (IFOR) would take additional measures for detecting the main anti-aircraft systems because he said parties to the conflict failed to meet the relevant provisions in the peace agreement for Bosnia.

Cumming added that IFOR would assist the work of humanitarian and other organizations (notably the ICRC, UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]) included in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

International Police Force Spokesman Alexander Ivanko said the authorities of the RS, the serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were maintaining very correct relations with the international police force.

Asked about RS Army Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, now in a Muslim jail in Sarajevo after The Hague War Crimes Tribunal had dropped the case against him, Ivanko said the international police force were following up his case but his release has not yet been announced.

As regards the four mujaheddin arrested by the Croatian police near Senj, on the northern Croatian coast, IFOR representatives confirmed that the Croatian authorities brought charges against them for carrying out command actions in Croatia.

B-H: Buha Reports No Contacts With FYROM Government

LD0904161096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1458 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 9 Apr (SRNA)—Belgrade's recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] is the concern of Yugoslavia as an independent state, while the Serb Republic and the part of the Serb nation which lives in it had nothing to do with the decision, [Bosnian Serb] Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha told SRNA today.

He said he regrets reactions by certain Greek media to the Belgrade-Skopje agreement on mutual recognition and added that "there have been no contacts between the government of the Serb Republic and the government of the FYROM."

"We are very sorry that the Greek media have misunderstood the whole situation and identified our position with that of the FRY," Buha said. [passage omitted]

B-H: Karadzic Says Serbs 'Victims of Manipulation'

LD0904213196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 9 Apr (SRNA)—Serb Republic [RS] President Radovan Karadzic said in Pale this evening that "institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not exist" and that "they will be established once elections in the RS and the Croat-Muslim Federation have been held."

"I am afraid that we have again become victims of manipulation which led to the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina," President Karadzic told SRNA, commenting on attempts by the Muslim government in Sarajevo to present itself as the legitimate representative of all three nations in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina through its activities at various international meetings.

"The only joint body that has been envisaged is the civilian commission; we have been fully participating in its work and are contributing to it," the Serb Republic president said.

President Karadzic said that a RS delegation will take part in the two-day [aid] donors' conference in Brussels on 12 and 13 April only if it receives an official invitation from Carl Bildt.

"Of course, it goes without saying that the RS delegation will be treated completely equally, both at the conference and later in the division of aid," President Karadzic said.

Responding to accusations that the RS has not released all POW's, President Karadzic said that the RS is a victim of manipulation here as well, "as Bildt's deputy, German diplomat Michael Steiner, openly sided with the Muslims."

"The RS has completely fulfilled all the responsibilities it assumed from the Dayton agreement. All the POW's have been handed over, except for those against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted," Karadzic

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said, adding that their fate is now in the hands of the Hague tribunal.

Stressing that the international community must accept the reality in the field if it wishes to see regional stability here, President Karadzic said that "the RS will continue to contribute to the full implementation of the Dayton agreement, which envisages the existence of two entities on an equal footing."

Speaking about the trials under way in The Hague and in Muslim Sarajevo against Serb officers General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, Karadzic said that this is "a great shame for the international community."

"We had to invest tremendous efforts to prevent the people from reacting in the way in which anyone would react to such a humiliation and insult. General Djukic should be released immediately, not only because he is in poor health but because he is innocent," the RS president added.

As far as the trial of Colonel Krsmanovic in Muslim Sarajevo is concerned, Karadzic said that this is "a particular shame for the international community, because his treatment is different from the treatment of other POW's."

"To make matters even worse for the international community, he was kidnapped after the signing of the peace agreement," President Karadzic concluded.

B-H: Karadzic Attends Government Session on Reconstruction

LD0904201596 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic is in session in Pale. The ministers are expected to examine the contract on financing a macroeconomic project, entitled: Reconstruction and Development of the Serb Republic in 1996 and 1997. The session is attended by Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and People's Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik.

[Unidentified correspondent] Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik actively took part in the work of the session. The participants reviewed economic policy measures for the reconstruction and development of the Serb Republic and established its priorities. They reiterated the resolve of the Serb Republic to actively participate in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, but warned that peace and stability in this region depends on equitable treatment for both entities established in Dayton.

President Radovan Karadzic pointed to attempts by the international community to discriminate against the Serb Republic in an effort to carry out the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that a long diplomatic struggle lies ahead for the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Serb Republic.

Serb Republic Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik told government members about the results of today's talks with the international community's Deputy High Representative Michael Steiner, who expressed his satisfaction at the fact that the Serb Republic fulfilled its obligations from the Dayton agreement concerning the release of POW's. [passage omitted]

B-H: Kasagic on Economic Cooperation, Currency Issue

AU1004082396 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by S.R.: "We Shall Not Turn Hard Cash Into Debt"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 8 March—Through Carl Bildt, high representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Accord, and his assistant, Michael Steiner, the international community has been trying to reintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina indirectly with economic ties. However, this is proceeding slowly because there is no reintegration in the Muslim-Croatian federation itself, let alone on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"The attempts to impose some unified systems on us are a clear attempt by the international community to economically reintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regarding the Serb Republic, we will accept talks and negotiations, not only with the Muslim-Croatian federation, but also with Croatia, Slovenia, FRY, and all other countries that will express interest in economic cooperation with the Serb Republic. The Serb Republic simply cannot bring into question the level of statehood and independence achieved in Dayton with anything," Kasagic says.

Carl Bildt, a senior representative of the international community, suggested that the German mark could be the main currency in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the transition period. Nobody from the Serb Republic opposed this, however, Kasim Omicevic, director of the so-called National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was categorical:

"Only the Bosnian dinar, and not the Serbian dinar or the kuna, can be the currency in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The German mark can be a sort of an auxiliary form of payment [words indistinct].

"The best variant would actually be the one proposed by us—that the Yugoslav dinar be used on the territory of

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the Serb Republic, the kuna on the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia, and the Bosnian dinar on the Muslim territory. The means of payment between the two entities would be the German mark," Kasagic says.

B-H: Serbs Accuse Muslims of Holding Serb POW's in Zenica

LD0904144796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1225 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Doboj, 9 Apr (SRNA)—According to the International Red Cross and the 1st Krajina Corps commission for the exchange of POWs, a number of registered and unregistered Serb POWs are still being held in Muslim prisons.

The International Red Cross registered Dusko Pasalic of Vozuca in Tuzla on 2 February. After a month spent in Tuzla, he was transferred to Zenica prison where he remains to this day.

The Muslim authorities have accused him of alleged war crimes and are holding him in prison unlawfully because he is not wanted by the Hague tribunal.

The Muslim commission for the exchange of POWs has admitted that Serb soldiers Dusan Skrebic, Nenad Skrebic, and Adem Kurtovic are also imprisoned in Zenica. They have not been registered, and the the Muslim authorities have not published any accusations against them yet.

Drago Ilic is imprisoned in Tuzla and, according to Muslim investigators, he is a former prison guard of Batkovici near Bijeljina.

He has not been registered, and the same is true for a number of Serb soldiers the Muslim authorities are hiding in prisons and camps despite claims that they have fulfilled all their commitments under the Dayton agreement. [passage omitted]

B-H: Three Bosniak POW's Released From Pale Prison

AU0904184496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Through the mediation of Michael Steiner, deputy to the high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kemal Alagic, Enver Krasic, and Hasan Hrnjadovic were released from the Serb prison in Pale today. The three were on the POW list of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], but the Serb authorities failed to hand their files over to The Hague Tribunal. According to the data possessed by the ICRC office in Sarajevo, there are 17 more prisoners in the Pale prison.

B-H: Some 200 POW's Released From Serb Sljivovica Camp

AU1004152796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The latest news concerning the former prisoners of war from the Sljivovica detention camp reads: 200 men from Zepa and Srebrenica, former internees of the Sljivovica camp in Serbia, have been released today. These men arrived in Kalesija in the afternoon, and after a short break they proceeded toward Zenica, where, in the majority of cases, they will reunite with their families. [passage omitted]

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Croatia: Protest to Bosnia Over 'Terrorist' Suspects

LD0904184196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement from the Foreign Ministry in connection with the arrest of a group of people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was reported yesterday.

Jaksa Mujacic, deputy foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, today handed over to Sead Hadzagic, charge d'affaires of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb, a protest note which expresses profound concern over the arrival in Croatia of a group of people from Bosnia-Herzegovina who are suspected of planning to carry out terrorist activities on the territory of our country.

The Republic of Croatia expects the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation to cooperate in the ensuing investigation and to take necessary measures in the spirit of cooperation between the two states and in accordance with international norms.

Croatia: 'Terrorist' Suspects Said To Plan Assassination

LD0904172096 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As you know, police in the Republic of Croatia have arrested a group of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens who intended to carry out a terrorist attack in Croatia. Who are the members of this group and what kind of attack were they preparing?

According to a source that wished to remain anonymous, the group consists of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens from Bihac whose objective was the assassination of Fikret Abdic.

The members of the group are of Muslim nationality and have been living in Croatia for quite some time now. They managed to get close to Fikret Abdic on about a dozen occasions but did not have an opportunity to execute their plan; that is, the orders they received. Namely, they were only the executors while the brains behind this plan were individuals and structures within the Bihac Party of Democratic Action [SDA] who wished to physically rid themselves of Fikret Abdic, a dangerous political opponent.

Also taking part in the organization and preparation of the action against Abdic were members of the [Bosnian] Interior Ministry from the Bihac area. However, according to our source, the group also included certain people who in the meantime changed their minds and left it.

The detained members of the group had received a cash advance and were promised hefty sums once the job was completed.

The arrest of the group attempting to assassinate Abdic corroborates his claims that the SDA has been planning his liquidation for a long time since he broke away from Alija Izetbegovic and the SDA.

The motive of the SDA's radical wing for an attempt against Abdic's life was his founding of a new political party which was recently registered in Mostar. When it became clear that the amnesty — which is soon to be approved by the constituent assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation — would include Fikret Abdic and that he and his party would participate in the elections, the radical wing of the SDA wanted to get rid of Abdic at all costs, as they saw him as a dangerous political foe.

Croatia: Bosnian Police Allegedly Behind 'Terrorist' Group

AU1004120196 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by D. Miljus: "They Hid Arms in the Forest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb — For the time being there is still no official confirmation to whether or not the terrorist group captured in the Senj area on Thursday [4 April] had planned to kill Fikret Abdic. Officials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not confirm such speculations, but we nevertheless managed to learn some new details about the arrest that has "sparked the interest" of all Croatian and some international media.

The key words — planned assassination — were uttered by the officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The four arrested men are suspected of criminal acts according to Article 236 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia, in connection with Article 243, and of the criminal act described in Article 203, first sentence, of the Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia.

According to the material evidence gathered so far, the materials that had been made ready for the planned action included: two portable rocket launchers, four portable rocket launcher bombs, four hand grenades, a 7.62 mm caliber machine gun with 14 rounds of ammunition, five dispersion antitank hand grenades, a kilogram of plastic explosive, and three hand grenades. The arms were hidden in the little forest called Costabella near the Preluka camp along the Rijeka-Opatija road.

We have learned that the masterminds and organizers of the group that was supposed to carry out this assassination came from within the Bosnia-Herzegovina police

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security corps. The state prosecutor and the investigating judge of the Rijeka court have been informed about everything that has been done in connection with the arrest of the four-member group suspected of attempted assassination.

Croatia: U.S. Economic Cooperation, Brown's Visit Viewed

AU0904130296 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 5 Apr 96 p 4

[Commentary by Zeljko Buksa: "Economic Cooperation Maintains Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Unfortunately, the air crash near Dubrovnik tragically interrupted the initially successful visit of U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown and an economic delegation to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that was to have great importance for the overall U.S.-Croatian relations and particularly for development of economic cooperation between Croatia and the United States.

It is obvious that the United States is entering the second leg of its policy toward Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. After its great help in establishing peace in the region, it is now the turn of economic investment because the economic rehabilitation of badly war-damaged Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the main preconditions for maintaining and strengthening the peace reached by political and military measures.

Therefore, the arrival of the U.S. secretary of commerce with a strong economic delegation (some 15 people, mostly the leading people of large U.S. companies) was the best sign that after successful political cooperation the renewal of U.S.-Croatian business relations has also begun. The fact that the leading people from 15 distinguished corporations that are known for their large investments abroad were included in their economic delegation speaks about the seriousness of the U.S. intentions.

Many of them are among the largest in the world in their fields. For instance, the Bechtel Corporation from San Francisco and the Air & Water Technologies Corporation from Somerville, New Jersey in the field of infrastructure, ABB from Norfolk, Connecticut in the field of energy, Northwest Airlines from Minneapolis in the field of tourism, AT&T from Morristown, New Jersey in the field of telecommunications, and Riggs International Banking Corporation from Washington in the field of financial services.

The analysts believe that the visit of the U.S. delegation was supposed to represent the beginning of the opening up of Croatia to U.S. capital. It is also believed that this could bring additional security to our country because it is known that the United States, politically and in other ways, protects the investments of its companies abroad.

Immediately before Secretary Brown's visit the Exim Bank reached a decision that indicates the seriousness of the intentions of the U.S. Commerce Department regarding trade with Croatia, which would also pave the way for U.S. companies' investment in Croatia. That decision has paved the way for short- and long-term U.S. projects in Croatia's public sector, that is, the U.S. companies can start applying with their projects in Croatia, and the bank will stand as a direct creditor of U.S. projects or as an institution that will issue guarantees to those who are ready to invest in Croatia.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture recently approved $24 million in loan grants for the sale of U.S. agricultural products in Croatia within the program of export grants issued by the corporation commodity reserves. Thus, payment is guaranteed if the U.S. suppliers or the bank are not paid.

During the envisaged visit to Croatia, Secretary Brown and the representatives of U.S. corporations interested in participation in the reconstruction of Croatia were also supposed to hold talks with President Tudjman; Prime Minister Matesa; many ministers; Nadan Vidosevic, the president of the Croatian Chamber of Commerce; and distinguished Croatian businessmen about possible ways to extend the new cooperation. The Americans are particularly interested in cooperation in the fields of energy, telecommunications, tourism, transport, and financial services.

The signing of two agreements between the U.S. businessmen and Croatian Electric Power Supply [HEP]. [sentence as published] In Dubrovnik the chairman of the HEP management, Damir Begovic, signed a letter of intent with Joseph W. Sutton, president of the Enron Development Corporation from Houston, by which the U.S. company has been given an exclusive right to deliver, within 90 days, a bid to build, maintain, and supply gas for the expansion of production facilities of the Jertovec thermoelectric power plant, by which its power would be increased.

The U.S. corporation will finance the whole business, and HEP will purchase all the electric energy produced. If this deal goes through, then foreign investment in and the privatization of HEP will begin. The HEP chief was also to sign a similar document on Friday with Frank Maier, the chairman of the Managing Board of Ensearch International from Dallas, but the accident, unfortunately, has changed the plans.

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Because of all this, it is to be expected that the tragic accident will not disturb the start of the strengthening of the U.S.-Croatian economic cooperation because Secretary Brown also wanted to use economy as "the weapon of peace."

Croatia: Commentary Views FRY-FYROM Recognition

AU1004115896 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 96 p 1

[Commentary by Mihajlo Nicota: "Only the First Step"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although with an approximately two-week delay, Serbia has nevertheless recognized Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — FYROM]. During that period tension, uncertainty, and suspicion developed primarily in Skopje, but also somewhat in Brussels and even in Paris and London. In the end Belgrade made a long-expected and inevitable move. However, in line with the well-known underhanded ways of Serbian politics and diplomacy, that move involved some unexpected "countermoves." For instance, the two chiefs of diplomacy of the Republic of Macedonia (precisely under that name) and so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the agreement on mutual recognition in Belgrade and not in Skopje as it had been announced earlier.

Thus, President Milosevic of Serbia has evaded an "obligation" to "honor" that event with his personal visit to Skopje and meeting with President Gligorov, which has also been persistently announced at least in the Macedonian media. However, although the Belgrade politics and diplomacy have been trying hard to prove that they are "in control of the game," which means that they have been making moves the way and when they think it suits them best, there remains a well-known fact—precisely that the recognition of Macedonia was the first (pre)condition set by the European Union for the beginning of any kind of approach of the Serbo-Montenegrin state to Europe and for the start of the process of its integration into European institutions.

Over the last 10 days nervousness has, probably, risen both in Paris and London because France and Great Britain, by perhaps having sent their ambassadors to Belgrade prematurely, wanted to encourage the leaders of FRY to make that move "more painlessly." However, that is only the first move. It does not mean that now "all the doors to the world" are open to Belgrade. The FRY and Milosevic will, nevertheless, have to pass the primary test in the territory on which they started the aggressive war — in relation to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, Belgrade cannot at all expect to stroll into Europe without the usual procedure (about which Germany still takes care). And this usual procedure, among other things, includes also the recognition of those two — for Serbia — hardest nuts, as well as the final solution of all disputed points of the succession of the former SFRY (about which, again, primarily the Americans take care).

Croatia: Agents Said To Wiretap Politicians, Journalists

AU1004104996 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 22 Mar 96 pp 2-4

[Article by Jasna Babic: "SZUP Agents, Led by Smiljan Reljic and Acting on the Order of Minister Jarnjak, Wiretap Opposition Party Leaders, Independent Journalists, and Union Leaders Suspected of Planning the Assassination of President Tudjman!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before the arrival of Pope John Paul II in Croatia, the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs solemnly stated that over 3,000 policemen would take care of security for the Holy Father. The police action was named "Shepherd 900," doubtlessly after the biblical theme of the spiritual shepherd and his human flock.

What the public has not been told took place in strict conspiracy: The SZUP [expansion unknown], one of the six national secret services, was also included in the action. The SZUP had to solve the hardest task—to identify the persons and organizations that dream about the assassination of the Holy Father.

One of the former heads of the Service for State Security, today an official of the SZUP, made a list with his own hand and in strict conspiracy, of around 20 persons which should be submitted to the special methods, TKTR and TKTX. In the jargon of the Croatian secret service those curious abbreviations mark "secret control of telephone conversations" and "secret control of fax machines." In the words of a layman — secret wiretapping and secret recording of accessible Croatian citizens.

For months prior to the Pope's arrival to Croatia, the wiretapping department of the SZUP worked tirelessly and overtime. Aided by secret wiretaps (nicknamed "parica"), day and night exhausted spies listened, recorded, and analyzed the thoughts, allusions, and messages in the telephone conversations of the identified suspects....

Since the Pope left Croatia alive and well, [minister of internal affairs of Croatia] Ivan Jarnjak and Smiljan Reljic received praises from the state leadership, and over 3,000 decorations were given to over 3,000 employees of the Ministry of Interior who took part in the

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action for the protection of the Holy Father during his stay in Zagreb. Among the 1 million, who greeted the Pope on the streets of Zagreb and at the Hipodrom, there were indeed no assassins. One would say: So shrewd and effective was the action of wiretapping, with the metaphoric and biblical name "Shepherd 900!"

NACIONAL's journalists felt all the more cheated when they acquired the authentic document from the secret archives of the SZUP: "Plan for Operation and Implementation of OA Shepherd 900."

Expecting to find materials for a press thriller on heroic feats of Croatian spies, NACIONAL had to face a defeating discovery—the most famous and allegedly the best espionage mission of the Croatian SZUP was mostly directed against a few publicly known and very talkative people!

In the "Plan of Operation and Implementation of OA Shepherd 900" can be read that in the course of summer 1994, to protect the Pope the SZUP wiretapped the following persons: Fran Visnar, a VIJESNIK journalist; Denis Kuljis, former editor in chief of GLOBUS and presently editor of NACIONAL; journalists of PANORAMA and of DANAS; Josip Zebic, former publisher of AZUR magazine; Vesna Kanizaj, president of the Independent Union of Secondary Schools; Nenad Mrgan, president of the Union of the Croatian Railroad; Dragutin Lesar, president of the Union of Independent Unions of Croatia; Vilim Ribic, president of the Union in Science and at Universities; and Nikola Stedulo, president of the Croatian Statehood Movement [HDP].

Terrorist Within Gunshot Range of the Pope

True, on three and a half typed pages of the "Plan of Operation and Implementation of OA Shepherd 900," some Chetnik organizations and their leaders are also mentioned as a possible terrorist danger, but it is clear why the analytical brains of the SZUP did not prescribe measures for following and wiretapping them. Most of them are in Serbia and Bosnia, inaccessible even to the most modern Croatian techniques of espionage. But without them the "Plan of Operation and Implementation of OA Shepherd 900" would not really look that dangerous and impressive.

But even with their accessible suspects, journalists, union leaders, and opposition politicians, who are absolute dilettantes in organizing conspiracy and assassinations, the SZUP made a big security mistake, so big that NACIONAL discovered it two years later.

Despite the 24-hour wiretapping of telephones, one of those people who had been wiretapped came within gunshot range of the Pope unnoticed. Moreover, that person sat completely unnoticed in an honorary box the entire day, some 200 meters from the stage on which the Pope preached divine peace and Christian forgiveness to Croats. That was — as he admitted personally and of his own free will — Nikola Stedul [leader of HDP], who qualified as an "extremist" and a potential "terrorist" in the plan of operation of "Shepherd 900," and thus on the level of the leaders of the "Ravna Gora" Chetnik movement. Only no "parica" was installed to wiretap the "Ravna Gora," whereas there was one on Stedul's home phone.

"I received the official invitation for the Pope's Mass at the Hipodrome from the State Protocol," the president of the HDP says, who, after four years of inactivity, has returned to the domestic political scene: "I cannot understand how the security system in our country functions. The protocol invites me to enhance the Pope's visit with my presence, and the secret police wiretaps me as a potential assassin," Nikola Stedul says.

However, what is puzzling to Stedul is completely clear to NACIONAL's interlocutors from Croatian counterintelligence institutions. NACIONAL's espionage experts claim that Croatian services are so obsessed with wiretapping telephone conversations that they often fail to notice ordinary mail. The invitation which invited Stedul to the Hipodrome was sent by mail, not telephone lines, so the SZUP did not register the marked "object" in the honorary box.

In short, if on that unforgettable 1 September 1994 some murderous assassin had really been infiltrated among the delighted Croats, the Holy Father would rather have been protected by divine providence than by the operation of the Croatian SZUP.

Croats know that, as far as wiretapping is concerned, there is merciless continuity for them. From the moment telephones arrived here to the creation of the independent, multiparty, legal Croatian state. Historical differences, to put it in Marxist terms, are mostly contained in the degree of technological development.

While Croats lived as one of the nations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, telephone communications of the so-called state enemies were controlled in a primitive manner in the main post office on Draskoviceva Street. Wiretapping equipment and huge recorders were directly attached to telephone cables. The so-called wiretapping technicians at the time — usually women — would sit with earphones for hours. Not wanting to lose time, they would knit, crochet, or play with tarot cards, intently trying to register the examples of antistate, anticommunist, and separatist verbal delicti. They were, of course, proven "comrades," wives of important inspectors of the Service of State Security, so

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that at that time espionage in Croatia turned into a sort of exclusive family occupation.

Dilettantes Work With the Latest Technique

In the last years of communism until the summer of 1991, one of the main wiretapping positions was taken by Sonja Trazivuk, the legal wife of the head of the Service for State Security, Branko Trazivuk, then Elika Starcevic, wife of the chief Darko Stafcevic. In the first years of the multiparty system and of Croatian independence a similar example was embodied in the Susak family. While the defense minister [Gojko Susak] supervises the Croatian Army and its counterintelligence service SIS [expansion unknown], his wife Djurdja is the employee of HIS [expansion unknown] — as was published in NARODNE NOVINE — a member of the Executive Board of the military company "Alan," responsible for the import of secret military technology.

In the multiparty Croatia wiretapping has been improved. According to the claims of some espionage experts, in 1992 the leaders of the SZUP imported from the United States the most modern digital equipment, compatible with telephone systems which were introduced in Croatia by Ivica Mudrinic, at that time the minister of traffic and communications. With that technology the SZUP achieved absolute predominance over other secret services in the Republic of Croatia. When SIS, UNS [Office for National Security], Army intelligence, HIS, or the intelligence service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs wish to wiretap somebody, they have to go to their colleagues from the SZUP for help, because they themselves do not have such good wiretapping equipment.

In the merciless competition among the domestic intelligence services as to who will discover more state enemies, the SZUP is always well-informed about the (lack of) success of its rivals. There are much fewer cases to the contrary.

In any case, today there is no more wiretapping in Draskoviceva Street, no physical connection between cables, recorders, and the spies' ears. NACIONAL's intelligence sources explain that the modern method is much simple. The SZUP registers a fictitious firm, which asks for a free telephone line from the post office to get connected to the wanted telephone number as a "parica," i.e. wiretapped. When, for example, the telephone of Denis Kuljis, editor of NACIONAL, rings, at the same time the telephone with its answering machine rings in the wiretapping base of the SZUP. An exact, uncensured recording is made from the recorded talk (with all the swear words, giggling, sighs, unarticulated shouts), which is then forwarded to the SZUP's department for analysis. Then in the department for analysis they ruminate for days whether in Kuljis' head there are any suppressed thoughts of so-called "Yugonostalgia," as he orders popular topics from his journalists and assistants.

Yet the "objects" of TKTR and TKTX often notice themselves that they are being tapped — since, as it seems, the most modern equipment is attended by absolute technological dilettantes.

"They disturb me in my work," Nikola Stedul complains. "I send a fax — and the messages reaches the other person an hour or two later. Telephone lines are interrupted in the middle of conversations."

One distinguished Zagreb lawyer said that in the wiretapping base of the SZUP they once rewound the tape on the recorder incorrectly so that in the middle of his telephone conversation with a client he could constantly hear the voice of his daughter who had talked on the same telephone a little bit earlier.

The empioyees of the wiretapping department sometimes get so carried away that they themselves answer when the telephone they are tapping rings. They even say "hello" mechanically before they realize that the call is not intended for them but for their victim.

The predominant opinion in the domestic espionage community is that for the efficacy of the operation and implementation of the action it is not important if the suspect knows that a spy's ear listens to him. Allegedly an experienced spy and a refined analyst, despite the strictest self-censure on the telephone, can unmistakably discover even the bad intentions which have not been uttered.

Universal Assassins and Conspirators

Yet when in 1993 the journalists of SLOBODNA DALMACIJA asked if the SZUP wiretapped Croatian citizens, the minister of internal affairs, Ivan Jarnjak, the boss of Smiljan Reljic, nearly swore with the following words: "I emphasize that we do it very seldom, very restrictively, and that it has to be exclusively approved by the Ministry of Interior. When we do that, we have to inform the president of the republic." To the question by journalists whether the political parties sometimes complained of being secretly tapped, Jarnjak gave an even more resolute answer: "We have never had such complaints, God forbid!"

Until this moment and NACIONAL's discovery of the operative action "Shepherd 900," there has been no material evidence to contradict the minister's words. However, it is known that the espionage strategists of the SZUP are very skillful in accommodating their

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passion for the discovery of state enemies and for wiretapping with the law.

As a former employee of the SZUP, Minister Jarnjak really approves every secret control of telephone conversations and reports to President Tudjman about them regularly. According to the internal rules of the SZUP, a minister's approval for TKTR and TKTX is acquired with the help of a justified and reasonable explanation of the analytical department that wiretapping is a security and intelligence necessity in discovering state enemies of a quite definite category. In other words, a necessary part of a plan of operation and implementation in the fight against real and possible antistate forces. There is never a lack of such plans of operation and implementation; however, they mostly mention the same "objects." One day when the secret archives of the SZUP are discovered, future generations will probably get an impression that in the first years of independent Croatia there lived and acted universal assassins and conspirators. Mostly the same journalists, union leaders, and politicians are on the list of potential murderers not only of the Pope, but also of President Tudjman or of Minister Susak....

Before the announcement of the Pope's visit to Croatia inspired "Shepherd 900" counterintelligence operation, those public workers were wiretapped as a part of the action "Renault." Apparently a well-founded suspicion came about that some forces in a mutual secret plot were preparing the assassination of the Croatian head of state.

Except for Denis Kuljis and Fran Visnar, they also started tapping Tanja Torbarina, FERAL TRIBUNE, NOVI LIST, a few former editors of SLOBODNI TJEDNIK, and even the author of this text.

Then in the prevention of another sort of assassination of the Croatian president, there immediately followed the action "Goran;" although under a different code name and with a new approval of the minister, the same objects of wiretapping were once again registered as suspects. Then followed the plan of operation and implementation called "Return," and so on....

The Same People, the Same Methods, the Same Labels

A former employee of the SZUP remembers what sort of panic was provoked by a communication that someone somewhere was intending to poison the Croatian president—if not with poison in his food, then with a lethal substance which state enemies would rub unnoticed into his palm. Within an appropriate security operative plan (unfortunately NACIONAL's interlocutor cannot remember its code name), the president of the republic was advised to avoid shaking hands as much as possible. TKTR and TKTX measures were also imposed against people it knew only meet President Tudjman as viewers of his television appearances.

The well-informed say that all the enemies named by the Croatian president at the recent session of the Main Committee of HDZ had first been registered, qualified, and dealt with in secret operations by the SZUP, HIS, and UNS. It is only unclear whether the president believed in their bad intentions because he believes Croatian secret services, or did Croatian secret services whisper to the president the names which he himself wanted to hear.

Of course, to every reasonable man those spies' stories about journalists who dream of assassinations, about union leaders as potential terrorists, and about murderous leaders of registered and legal political parties seem like caricature and fantasy. Is it then possible that agents and analysts of the SZUP, and of other secret services, truly believe that VJESNIK's military commentator Fran Visnar is a hidden Serb-American spy — as is written in the plan "Shepherd 900?" Or that the former political emigrant Nikola Stedul, president of HDP, is an enemy of the state about which he dreamed for years?

"I returned to Croatia from emigration in 1991," Nikola Stedul reports. "Already then I had suspicions that I was being wiretapped, but I had no evidence of it. In 1994, however, I got firm evidence. With that evidence I addressed the highest intelligence instance in the Republic of Croatia. The intelligence official did not doubt the trustworthiness of the presented documents; he did not say that they were forged. On the contrary, he said that the responsible people would be punished, because they had obviously misused their position and power. Two years have since passed, but nothing has happened."

NACIONAL's espionage experts believe in something a little bit different. Through wiretapping, surveillance, and industrious writing of seemingly serious security and intelligence analyses — through all that industriousness, in which it is hard to see any sense and meaning — six almost identical intelligence services, including the SZUP, merely maintain the rationale for their own existence. Where else if not in the SZUP would those officials, 'operative workers,' and secret agents work, those who in the long years of their engagement have not learned anything besides how to register antistate elements, install wiretapping instruments, write operative plans which are always the same, invent "imaginative" code names — in the deep belief that there is a conspiracy lurking everywhere, and all one has to do is discover it.

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That is why, while they listen to long telephone conversations of journalists, of union and political leaders, they not only miss seeing mail addressed to Nikola Stedul, but also to the murderers of Ante Paradzik, Marko Bezer, Blaz Kraljevic, Mate Zoric Saban, Milan Krivokuca, and so on.

Croatia: Controversies in Zagreb Leadership Continue

LD0904195296 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb's budget for 1996 and other financial reports were the dominant subjects at a session of the Zagreb city council, chaired by Mayor Marina Matulovic-Dropulic. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The beginning of the session was marked by Dorica Nikolic, vice president of the Zagreb city assembly, who walked out in protest. She warned the mayor that the city assembly has twice given her a vote of no confidence and that decisions by this leadership cannot be accepted. She said she does not wish to break the law and contravene the constitution and left the session.

Stjepan Brolih, the Croat Democratic Union assembly vice president, explained that this was not the assembly's position but Mrs Nikolic's personal opinion.

While the session of the city leadership was still in progress, City Assembly Chairman Professor Dr. Zdravko Tomac, and Dorica Nikolic held a news conference. The subject was the issue of dual authority in the city of Zagreb and the latest events in this connection. They spoke about, as they said, the overstepping of the boundaries of the law by the executive authority.

They said that according to the law Mrs Marina Matulovic-Dropulic should have resigned the post of mayor following the no-confidence vote in the city assembly. As she had failed to do this within a period of 15 days after her appointment, she should have proposed a new city leadership, which she also failed to do. For this reason, Tomac said, the Croatian government will be asked to protect the legality of the work of the Zagreb executive authority. [passage omitted]

Croatia: HDZ Branch on Corruption in Sisak Oil Refinery

LD0904170496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In response to developments in the Sisak-based INA [Croatia oil company] oil refinery, the county board of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of the Sisak-Moslavina County has issued a statement. Branko Kanizaj reports:

[Kanizaj] At its 10th session, the executive of the HDZ county board discussed the political causes and consequences of recent events in the INA oil refinery in Sisak. As already reported, the events resulted in the dismissal of the most responsible officials from the Sisak's most important company and a brief detention for a number of them. In reaction to these events, the HDZ county board expressed support for the Sisak HDZ town committee stands sent to the HDZ main board under the title: Personnel Problems in the Sisak-Moslavina County.

The HDZ county board of the Sisak-Moslavina County insists on the rule of law and is against criminal activities and attempts to hush them up. To this end, all aspects of the INA oil refinery operation are being checked and anyone who has violated the law will be sanctioned. We think that a comprehensive control must be carried out of all business deals, not just by the Sisak oil refinery, but by the INA oil industry-Zagreb. We insist that the same rules apply throughout and that anyone who has violated the Republic of Croatia's positive regulations be sanctioned and that the public be informed about all this, the HDZ county board of the Sisak-Moslavina County says in its statement from the session chaired by Djuro Brodarac, chairman of the board and the Sisak-Moslavina County prefect.

Croatia: Beli Manastir Radio-TV Center Debates Policy

AU1004072096 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At yesterday's joint session of the management board and program council of the Beli Manastir Radio and Television center, thanks were expressed to the municipal authorities, the Baranja Division, and the employees of our public companies who made it possible for the radio and television to function even under the most difficult conditions.

One of the decisions was that the program council should devote next week to considering the spring and summer program, while the management board will deal with the topical issue of financing and providing other material and technical conditions for the normal functioning of Beli Manastir Radio and Television.

According to Dr. Radislav (?Mutavdzic), a particularly important thing for the (?business) and program orientation of Beli Manastir Radio and Television [words indistinct] is certainly these media's absolute devotion to the Serb national interest.

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At the same time said the acting director of Beli Manastir Radio and Television, no party allegiance could be felt on the frequencies of the radio and television, regardless of the form of journalistic expression. It was added that, in other words, Beli Manastir Radio and Television has managed to preserve its dignity of professional expression and is an authority that can be trusted.

It was also stated that much material investment and fresh personnel are necessary for the radio and television center to completely manage to perform its function as the citizens expect it to. The employees of this company are especially expected to participate actively in the practical implementation of the Erdut Agreement and in securing the recognition for all the peace initiatives.

It was unanimously decided that the Beli Manastir Radio and Television center has been and will remain a reputable medium in the area. Moreover, it was pointed out that more material investment is necessary for the functioning of this system, and the statement was heard in the discussion that the staff of Beli Manastir Radio and Television has in the past several months cooperated extensively with all the structures of the executive authority in the area.

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FYROM: PM Crvenkovski Praises Normalization

AU0904153896 Skopje MIC in English 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On the occasion of the mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and FRY, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski emphasized in the statement for A1 TV that the signing of yesterday's agreement in Belgrade is, without a doubt, an event of exceptional importance, which also has a historic dimension.

"This agreement has led to the mutual recognition of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of FRY and RM. By this agreement, the mutual border is formally proclaimed as an inter-state border, and the inter-state continuity is recognized—in the case of the Republic of Macedonia with the roots from ASNOM [Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia] of 1944," Crvenkovski said. He added: "What I would especially like to emphasize is that this agreement and the establishment of diplomatic relations is under the constitutional name Republic of Macedonia and I would not like to elaborate separately of what kind of enormous significance that is for us and our state."

"It seems to me that with today's act, the Republic of Macedonia has finalized the first stage of consolidation of the relations with its neighbors. Namely, today we can already conclude that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia is recognized by all four neighbors," Crvenkovski stated.

FYROM: Frckovski on Normalizing Ties to FRY

AU0904150796 Skopje MIC in English 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "We finished a good job yesterday. We regulated the fundamental relations between our two countries yesterday in a normal and dignified way, opening a new page in the history of relations between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the FR Yugoslavia, thereby contributing to the stabilization and development perspective of the whole region.

"Still, a large part of the work has yet to be done, especially considering the fact that the agreement itself implies a line of bilateral agreements in the economy, culture, transport as well as cooperation in the part of the international politics led by the two countries on an international plan.

"In any event, this will contribute considerably to the regional cooperation and prosperity of this troubled region," [Foreign] Minister Ljubomir Frckovski said after signing the Agreement on normalization of the relations between FR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia, and the establishment of diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadors.

FYROM: Serb Party Leader Welcomes Normalization

AU0904184096 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 9 Apr 96

[Statement by Dragisa Miletic, president of the Democratic Party of Serbs in FYROM; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recognition represents a guarantee of security in every respect, which in turn means development of the economy in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. It will certainly be much easier for us to realize our rights because this document obliges FYROM to grant the Serbs an equal status to all other communities in the country, and to put them back in the Constitution.

I have to stress one thing: The Serbs in FYROM are only demanding what the Macedonian Constitution contains—that is, all our earlier requests were directed at getting the legitimate authorities to observe their own constitution. We hope that this will now be much, much easier.

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Poland: Minister Assails Media Negativism Over Moscow Trip

LD1004113996 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski expressed the view that Polish-Russian military cooperation could shorten our road to NATO. In an interview for Polish Radio, Minister Dobrzanski explained that this view was warranted by what, according to him, was the positive reaction of the Western states to his recent visit to Moscow. The minister maintains it was rather the reaction of Polish media and some politicians to the decisions made in Moscow that aroused anxiety in the West.

The head of the defense department said Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's surprise at what Polish media described as an excess of proposals resulted from the silence that had prevailed between the two departments for the past three years. Meanwhile, the agreement on Polish-Russian military cooperation signed by Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz in 1993 and the NATO Partnership for Peace program constitute, according to Minister Dobrzanski, a so far unused basis for establishing closer contacts with the Russian Army.

The minister also gave assurances that, in spite of what the journalists wrote after Minister Grachev's news conference, he did not perceive during his talks with the Russian partners that, after our entry to NATO, we would face the threat of a halt in the supplies of spare parts for Russian and Soviet military equipment used by the Polish Army.

Poland: Opposition Parties Criticize State's Russia Policy

WS0904144896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski and Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Conclusions From Recent Contacts; Is Poland Submissive to Russia?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Politicians from the extra-parliamentary opposition as well as from the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] and the Union of Labor [UP] maintain that the governing coalition is exhibiting submissiveness to Russia, though they would prefer to think that this submissiveness is a result of subconscious habit rather than fully cognizant intentions on the part of politicians currently occupying top state offices in Poland. Deputies from the governing coalition disagree, claiming that there are no signs indicating Poland's submissiveness to Russia. Bronislaw Geremek of the Freedom Union [UW] thinks likewise, yet he is disturbed by the conduct of some political parties and a lack of coordination in our foreign policy.*

The Submissiveness of Some Parties

"I do not think Poland is subservient to Russia in any way. Some political groups, however, are excessively acquiescent to Russian interests, sometimes forgetting the interests of their own state," says Bronislaw Geremek of UW, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission. He refuses to give any names.

"This goes particularly for economic relations," he adds. "I agree that Poland has traditional ties to Russia dating back to the previous century. These ties, however, need not imply subservience. In my view, Polish interests are currently well protected as far as fuel and energy supplies are concerned. After the meeting President Aleksander Kwasniewski held with representatives of political parties on the eve of his visit to Russia, I feel it is clear that the president and the political parties want this visit to demonstrate that Poland is a sovereign state protecting its own interests. There might be topics on which Poland and Russia disagree, but it is very important to identify those areas while targeting the broadest possible fields in which Polish-Russian relations can be developed. Coordination in our foreign policy, however, is still lacking. The visit paid by the defense minister just days before the president's visit to Moscow continues to raise doubts and controversy."

Neither Servility nor Moralizing

"I do not see any signs of submissiveness," says Tadeusz Iwinski of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], a member of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission.

"We should talk with Russia on the same principles as we would with any other state: calmly, from the position of an equal partner, with none of the servility we displayed in the past, but also without the moralizing we did several years back. We have to show understanding for our partner and his views, but that does not necessarily mean we have to agree.

"I believe it is very important to identify all of the topics we do not agree on—meaning NATO—and there is no room for concessions here. Yet we can talk with Russia not only about NATO, but also about a future security structure in which there is room for the Russians as well. There are a great many details to discuss. The differences in views on NATO must not impede dialogue on other topics. It is a mistake to jump to conclusions on the talks [Defense] Minister Dobrzanski held in Russia on arms supplies. It is not true that we see military cooperation with NATO and Russia as a top priority. Contacts within the Partnership

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for Peace project are indisputably more important," says the SLD deputy.

Russia Is Not Expecting Submissiveness

"I see no signs of Poland's submissiveness in relations with Russia. I associate submissiveness with a certain degree of dependency, a lack of criticism, or even outright political servility," says Tadeusz Samborski of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], a member of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission.

"I do see a willingness to talk, to consult each other, to treat dialogue as a priority. Dialogue can get you very far. There is no need to cultivate submissiveness. I do not think that is what Russia expects of us," says the PSL deputy.

"I think we are equal partners. Minister Dobrzanski's visit was one of the practical means of cooperation. After all, we are simultaneously developing military cooperation with other states, both NATO members and states that are still waiting to be admitted—for example, the Czech Republic. This is normal between states that trust each other. Minister Dobrzanski did not exceed his prerogatives in any of his statements or decisions."

Choosing Well-Trodden Paths

"There is definitely some truth in the statement that the Polish state officials are currently more submissive to Russia, although I think this is intuitional rather than deliberate," says Ryszard Bugaj. The chairman of UP claims that the coalition politicians subconsciously follow the paths trodden over the years and make use of old contacts. "I think they do not see that the state interests Russia has defined contradict those of Poland," says Bugaj.

Leszek Moczulski shares the views of the UP chairman. The KPN chairman maintains that politicians from the former Polish United Workers Party have a deeply rooted belief they should stick close to Russia, although they are not fully aware of this. Moczulski does stress, however, that nearly all of the governments after 1989 were submissive to our eastern neighbor and reminds us that, when Tadeusz Mazowiecki was prime minister, he said that the presence of Soviet troops on our territory was in our interest. "That submissiveness was a result of fear. That fear later disappeared. The currently growing submissiveness to Russia is a result not only of fear, but also of the will to reinstate the 'traditional friendly relations we had after World War II,'" says the KPN leader.

Is Kwasniewski Afraid of the Bear Hug?

"Coalition politicians, among them Aleksander Kwasniewski, instinctively accept the conditions given by Russia. They are ready, for example, to negotiate our membership in NATO with Russia, despite the fact that the only partners for such talks are NATO member states," says Moczulski. During the president's meeting with leaders of the parliamentary clubs last Thursday [4 April], I was under the impression that Kwasniewski was afraid the Russians might "greet him the way they most like—with the traditional bear hug." "At the same time, the president by no means feels like a client in deciding to negotiate certain issues," says the KPN leader. [passage omitted]

Poland: Article Reviews Polish Arms Sales

WS0504143296 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 15-17 Mar 96 pp 5-7

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "Top Secret Special Business Dealings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *We are no power in the arms trade. The Czechs are doing better than we are in the arms market.*

There is no use deceiving ourselves. Our NATO allies-to-be, especially the Americans, are carefully watching all Polish attempts to export "special equipment," which, in the language of public speeches in Poland, is a euphemism for guns, ammunition, and military equipment.

Due to a strange twist of fate, habits acquired during the period of the "real socialism" die hard. At that time it was unbecoming to admit trading arms.

In countries of well-rooted democratic systems like France, the conclusion of an excellent contract for the delivery of fighter planes, tanks, or missiles to anywhere in the world that is not under a UN embargo is reason for public celebration. In our country, such "embarrassing" news would be kept secret, and only after the passing of some time would news about an "increase in income from special exports" be announced.

Who Tipped Off Jordanian Customs Officers?

Last week, not only journalists but also visibly concerned American diplomats began searching for news only a couple of hours after receiving a REUTER report on the interception of containers with Polish signatures on them in Amman, the capital of Jordan. As reported, the containers held "interchangeable parts for jet fighters, smuggled to Iraq." Washington demanded prompt information about it.

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It was soon discovered that Poland does not manufacture parts for Iraqi Su-22 fighter bombers. On the contrary, the country itself is experiencing a severe shortage of parts. It was then uncovered that the alleged interchangeable plane parts were, in fact, agricultural crop-dusting equipment for Mi-2 helicopters. The equipment, legally and in accordance with all of the rules of international law, had been sent to a company licensed in Jordan and named El Imman [as published] Establishment (to be precise, the company was led by an Iraqi authorized to conduct trade agricultural equipment).

Jordanian Customs officers must have wanted to display exceptional watchfulness and operational skills, but, still, they missed. To everyone who knows the realities of the Middle East, numerous questions must be coming to mind.

Who advised the officials in Amman to look for the "Iraqi contraband" in the cargo coming by air from Warsaw via Amsterdam?

Who immediately informed REUTER reporters about that? The real attempt to smuggle Russian gyroscope systems for guiding Iraqi missiles through Amman did not receive that much publicity.

Who made the suggestion that the metal objects discovered in the Polish containers had to be parts for fighter planes, and who made sure that the news would be immediately known worldwide?

We may never find answers to these questions. Already after the alleged "Jordanian scandal" was cleared up, a specialist from our arms sector who wanted to remain anonymous bitterly noticed one interesting thing. Somehow, nobody noticed that, in Iran, a country accused of supporting terrorism and surrounded by U.S. trade barriers, airplanes and helicopters that were produced in the United States are still operating. One way or another, then, spare parts must be delivered there. And the international uproar created by the "Jordanian affair" will remain in the memory of prospective buyers of Polish helicopters, despite the halfhearted denial by the REUTER.

Tanks for the Republic, Airplanes for Franco

Probably, only a narrow circle of specialized historians know how large interests were made during the Spanish Civil War in 1930's in the under the Pyrenees—despite the international embargo placed on both fighting sides. Failed PWS-10 fighters were disposed of to the Nationalist air force. And antiquated French tanks—the Renault FT—were traded for ingots of pure gold from the "Reds," on the Republican side of the front. Our intelligence skillfully disguised deliveries of vehicles, citing Uruguay as their destination. Some, now deceased, military men recalled that "Reds" and "Nationalists" were sold old Mauser ammunition, which—unexpectedly—was very much appreciated.

After the war, what was lost was true sovereignty and a flair for such daring business. Shrewdness and intelligence of people were, at that time, used for other tasks. One was the acquiring of a complete West German Leopard tank and the smuggling of it through the Iron Curtain in Bulgaria, which was a real accomplishment of our military intelligence.

It was, in fact, only after the political "thaw" of 1956, that we started to look for international clients who would buy the arms and ammunition that we had produced in mass quantities during the Korean crisis. The Polish version of Kalashnikov carbines, produced in Radom, and ammunition from Pionki soon won the approval of buyers from many parts of the world. During the relentless hot periods in the Middle East, it was discovered that Polish T-55 tanks, produced under license in Bumar-Labedy and delivered to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, were much better than their Soviet prototypes. We also managed to sell to many countries Lim-2 and Lim-5 jet fighters (that is licensed MiG-15bis and MiG-17) that were produced in large quantities in Mielec.

The Soviet Navy also used to buy the majority of its warships from the Northern Shipyard, which specialized in manufacturing of rapid assault units (a few of which were then sold to India, too).

Polish Iskra Was Beaten by Czech Delfin

Czechoslovakia was much more successful in the international arms markets. It can be easily proved that the most faithful Moscow ally in Central Europe, both before and after 1968, received greater far-reaching support and a true "Big Brother's blessing" while supplying the arsenals of leftist developing countries in Asia and Africa. The "wavering" Poland could not count on such a big favor. Without the knowledge and consent of Moscow, Prague would not have been able to set up in Libya the main repair and refit center that served the whole region (Poland only designed the Libyan radar system, for which we have never received any payment, though).

In the early 1960's, our southern neighbor succeeded in what was a gigantic leap. The competition for the Warsaw Pact's main jet trainer was won by Czechoslovak L-29 Delfin [Dolphin] and not by Polish Iskra [Sparkle]. This was in spite of the fact that—as recalled by witnesses of these events—the Iskra was the better machine. But it was Delfin and, then, its successor, the L-29 Albatros [Albatross] that went to Cuba, Vietnam, Uganda, and Egypt. Czechs flooded all the former

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protegees of Moscow, all around the globe, with their fighter planes. Even now, they are completing contracts for deliveries of modernized Delfins to the countries where they have established themselves, due to the former influence of the Soviet Union.

We, for that matter, stayed with the Iskra, which used to be produced in Mielec, and the advantages of which were appreciated only by the Indians (India bought 50 Iskras for their military schools for pilots) and—only recently—by wealthy amateur pilots in the United States and Great Britain.

The Secret of the Negative List

It would seem that after the regaining of sovereignty and collapse of the whole Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it would be possible to move almost everywhere, promoting exports of our military systems. Apart from that, arms producing plants have received the right to conclude contracts by themselves, or through a middle man of their choice, and not one assigned by the headquarters. The signing of a contract, however, requires approval by two ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministries hold the so-called negative list of the countries with which any arms trade is forbidden for Polish companies. These, naturally, include countries embargoed by the United Nations, such as Iraq or Bosnia; but the list also contains a whole undisclosed group of capitals excluded from the "special turnover" because of some "crucial political interests of the Polish Republic." A certain diplomat explained this without covering things: "We value the United States' assistance more than the prospects of earning a couple tens of millions of dollars. This, though, is difficult to explain to the workers and managers of arms plants, who pray for each contract."

Syria and Iran were considered by the United States as countries supporting terrorism. Our southern neighbors did not give that much thought, completing delivery of T-72M tanks to Damascus. Bumar Labedy, PZL-Okecie, and several other Polish companies had concluded contracts with Tehran. It was only natural, then, that the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation reacted with a real uproar at the public declaration by the incoming minister of foreign affairs of that time, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who—without previously consulting with anybody—announced that Poland was breaking all business relations with Tehran. Labedy had to give up hopes for a big sale of tanks to Tehran, after delivering a small number of our T-72M to the Islamic Republic.

One of the greatest secrets of the Polish arms trade is its legal and—in some way—technological dependency upon ...Moscow. The majority of types of weapons that we, in one way or another, offer to our customers, were conceived in Soviet drafting rooms. The Soviet Union prepared the license agreements with our industry so that it skillfully secured for itself control over the direction of exports of the equipment manufactured in Poland. Tanks and armored vehicles were for a long time a specialty of our exports. As early as the 1970's we made a prototype of a laser system for directing Merida fire by our T-55's. The "allies," nonetheless, forbade scientists from the Military Technical Academy [WAT] even to mention Merida, which greatly increased the accuracy of the tank. Our discovery reportedly "disagreed with the standardization process within the Warsaw Pact, concerning that kind of weapon."

Grom—That Is, Igla

Currently, there are serious problems with what could be the hit of our arms production, that is the new shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile Grom [Thunder]. Our Grom is the Russian Igla [Needle]. Not long ago, Russia managed to sell as many as 10,000 of those missiles to Brazil. While the Soviet Union was crumbling, parts for the guidance systems for 250 Iglas were bought and transported to Poland for petty sums of money. Theoretically, we had antiaircraft weapons comparable in parameters with the famous American Stingers, as we had already been producing the former version of the Russian Strzala-2 [Arrow] missile in the Mesko arms factory.

What was necessary to do was to put things up—as engineers say, "integrate" and test it, and you have got it. In practice, it turned out that it was not so easy. Not everything was brought from Russia and Mesko was unable to cope with some of the technical problems without Russian help. Grom prototypes were missing their targets. Russians are said to have severely punished those responsible for delivering Igla parts to Poland, and they have demanded horrendous sums of money for completing the Grom project. What is more, they are—in fact—demanding the right to decide, together with Poles, about the possible direction of Grom exports that are already being produced in Mesko. We, certainly, cannot agree to that, still....

As we have unofficially learned, this is one of the major points of argument in the Polish-Russian technological and military cooperation agreement that was negotiated a long time ago. Moscow does not want to make concessions, the Grom project cannot be completed, the drafted agreement cannot be initialed, and without signing it, the Russians do not intend to deliver spare parts to Poland needed—among other things—for the upkeep of MiG-29's acquired recently from the Czech Republic. What is more, the "embarrassing" thing is

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kept secret and even mentioning it shuts the lips of those who are in the know. It is known that the Polish negotiating team has been guided by Jan Czaja, the deputy minister of foreign economic cooperation. And, somehow, it does not seem likely that the appropriate signatures will be made on the agreement during the planned visit of President Kwasniewski to Moscow.

Small Is Valuable

The notion—Polish arms sales—usually brings to mind the "rifle affair," although it should really be remembered as the "rifle provocation," which we carelessly allowed ourself to be dragged into. Another thing that pops up is the vision of 300 T-72M tanks that were not finally disposed of to Pakistan. It is said that former Minister of National Defense Zbigniew Okonski is to blame for that.

And, finally, we have memories of the investigation into the background of the sale of the most modern combat vehicle used by our infantry, the BWP-2, to Angola, without the knowledge of the minister of national defense (recently, it is being said the price for the vehicles was too low, and the money was used to buy an air conditioning system for a public building).

This is, however, not the whole story of our armament sector's defeats in the international market. Fights over the Iryda have destroyed the chances for exports to some developing countries of the Iryda equipped with Western-produced avionics and Rolls Royce Viper engines (the market was captured by the Czechs). The Orlik [Young Eagle] turboprop plane used for training, lost out in competition for the Hungarian market. Stalowa Wola, the manufacturer of the MTLB [expansion unknown] armed transport vehicle (Russian license), had to watch MTLB vehicles from the former East Germany going at a reduced price to Sweden.

"A disaster," one would say. "A real disaster," admit specialists. They point out to the scarcity of orders from our military.

But the intelligent directors or managers of the single-proprietor, Treasury-owned companies have already prepared a lifeline for themselves in the form of civil production, leaving no more than 10-15 percent of production for military purposes. After all, Labedy could not live for a whole year on the income from the 10 or 20 Twardy [Hard] tanks and on dreams. They sell, therefore, special heavy tracked vehicles and gigantic self-propelled cranes.

Hope in Precision Equipment

And the real money made in the "special sector" is not made from steel giants, but from small but absolutely accurate instruments that are indispensable in each modern conflict. The customer pays in these cases not for the volume but for the effect of intellectual work.

The Industrial Optical Center [PCO], the producer of Drawa, the excellent Polish targeting system for T-72M tanks, does not complain. During the cutthroat tests at proving grounds in India, Drawa defeated everything else. The Finnish military which is upgrading its Russian-produced T-72M tanks, wants to bet on Drawa. The warning system for "laser strafe" produced by Warsaw PCO was picked up by the choosy Czechs, who have begun refitting their tanks. Radars from Warsaw Radwar have modernized the Romanian air defense system.

Still, we have some accomplishments in the arm market, not only in the sphere of electronics and optics. Cambodia has bought T-55 tanks that were mothballed in military warehouses. Yemen has bought a shipment of small arms and ammunition. It is said that in 1994 there was an increase of sales in the "special sector," although precise figures are hardly obtainable. The year 1995 still waits to be evaluated.

Southeast Asia is rapidly increasing its military potential. It is no secret that one of the goals of Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's trip to that region will be the promotion of our helicopters, tanks, and ships. Experts maintain that chances for selling several 10's of Polish T-72M tanks to Malaysia are very great. May fortune be more favorable for us, this time....

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Romania: Defense Minister Views NATO Membership Issues

AU0904140096 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 9 Apr 96 p 10

[Interview with Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Tibor Bogdan; place and date not given: "Hungary and Romania Must Join NATO at the Same Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Competition for NATO membership can have a negative effect on relations between Romania and Hungary, especially if Budapest is admitted sooner than Bucharest, Romanian Defense Minister Ghoerghe Tinca says in his interview given to MAGYAR HIRLAP. According to Tinca, it is to be feared that a "one-sided" NATO expansion will lead to an arms race in the region.*

[Bogdan] A kind of competition is on between the central European former socialist countries for NATO membership, over the issue of which country will be able to join NATO already in the first round. How would bilateral relations develop if Hungary joined NATO before Romania?

[Tinca] It is a fact that the region's countries are seemingly competing with each other for NATO membership. However, for whom is this competition useful? Let us just think about Romania and Hungary. Would one of these countries feel more secure if the other did not enter NATO? If Romania is left out of NATO? If Romania stays out of NATO as some people would like to believe then this will not make Hungary or any other central European country victorious. Sometimes I get the feeling that by spreading the idea of competition, the intention is to create an unfavorable atmosphere for bilateral relations. If we want to compete at all costs, then we should be doing it in the interest of speeding up the basic treaty, promoting bilateral relations, and urging historic conciliation, by which we all can only gain.

[Bogdan] Nevertheless, what would happen in this hypothetical situation?

[Tinca] It would be a mistake for Hungary to become a NATO member before Romania. At the same time, even in this case, we do not wish to take extreme steps because this would be contrary to the logic of our interests. If Hungary entered NATO before Romania, I do not deny that it would cause anxiety for us because, through this, Hungary would gain a right to prevent Romania's future membership or to attach certain conditions to its membership. This line of thought is proved by the fact that certain people are persistently trying to get Hungary to join NATO in the first group and at the same time depict Romania's chances as minimal. An attitude that distinguishes between the two countries can launch a rather complicated process whose course it is difficult to foresee. This process would have a harmful effect on the region's balance also by possibly leading to an arms race. I would not even like to think about what consequences this would have for the economies of the region's countries. However, ultimately I think that the tenacious emphasizing of the competition between us can also be a simple political game which, within certain limits, I can understand.

[Bogdan] What are your views on Romania's chances for NATO membership?

[Tinca] We continue to trust our chances. Some solid factors do exist in the flood of opinions, analyses, and guesses. NATO's decision to expand its membership is one of them. The official U.S. and NATO statements rejecting discrimination against the candidate countries, the statements that no secret candidate lists have been prepared, and that integration will be a gradual, considered, and open process are others. In addition, we are aware of our own potential, our geopolitical force. Our policy with the neighboring countries also contributes to the region's stability and security. We have no territorial demands against any of our neighbors, and we are interested in developing our relations with all states. The goal is for NATO to remain viable, but to achieve this, expansion which takes care of the security consideration is needed. It is difficult to imagine this process with Romania's exclusion because our country which lies on the southern wing of NATO would at least ensure the alliance's geostrategic unity.

[Bogdan] In the framework of the reform of the Romanian Armed Forces, troops have been regrouped and the Defense Ministry was criticized for this by several people. The regroupings will continue in the future, too. What makes this necessary?

[Tinca] The territorial restructuring of the armed units has not become necessary only in Romania, it has been implemented in all former member states of the Warsaw Pact. It is known that, at the time, the armies were allocated according to the Warsaw Pact's operational plans. No Soviet troops were stationed in Romania, our participation in the Warsaw Pact had some special features. For example, Romanian troops were stationed in the country primarily in accordance with the national defense doctrine; therefore, after the Pact was dissolved, we needed smaller changes than the others. It was precisely the reform of military forces which required the relocation of some of the troops. For a long time, some representatives of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] have been claiming that the few military

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units stationed in Harghita and Covasna counties would change the ethnic composition of the counties with a Hungarian majority. I have been answering such statements and giving the necessary explanations for two years now. I was able to witness personally that, on the level of the local population, no antagonistic feelings exist against the soldiers, in contrast to what some RMDSZ representatives claim. My feeling is that attention is constantly drawn to this issue to maintain the already known atmosphere.

[Bogdan] In Romania, much is being said about the reform, which has become an order of the day—to use a military term—within the army. What point have the Romanian Armed Forces reached in this respect?

[Tinca] I can say that the reform is at an advanced stage in Romania. We have finished the transformation of the military units, their territorial relocation, and the size of the personnel and the military technology have been reduced in accordance with the international agreements we have also signed. We have abolished 45,000 positions, and we will remove another 35,000 by the year 2000, which will make the Romanian army 190,000 strong. It is gratifying to hear high-ranking officials of NATO and the United States say that, from a structural point of view, in its basic elements the Romanian Army already now meets NATO's requirements.

Romania: Roman Sees NATO Adherence as Security Guarantee

AU0904161196 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 2 Apr 96 p 9

[Interview with Petre Roman, Democratic Party president and USD presidential candidate, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "We Want To Ensure Our National Security Through Our Joining NATO, Not Through Any Measures Against Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Having been invited—in his capacity as president of the Defense, National Security, and Public Order Commission of the Chamber of Deputies—to attend the symposium "Russia and Central and Eastern Europe—Old Dimensions, New Bridges," which took place in Moscow on 29-30 March, Petre Roman, candidate of the Social Democratic Union [USD] to Romania's presidency, said on his return home that "it is necessary to emphasize our reasons and determination to become part of the free world structures over and over again, with untiring regularity, because there is still the risk that our voice might not be strong enough, given the fact that Russia's opposition can be wrought with worries and risks." In this context, the president of the Defense, National Security, and Public Order Commission of the Chamber of Deputies pointed out: "We want to ensure our national security by joining NATO, not through any measures against Russia."*

[Roman] This conference was organized in order to bring together—and put face to face, one might add—prominent political representatives from the United States, Russia, and the Central European countries—that is, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The basic subject was security and stability in Europe, but we constantly talked in one way or another about NATO expansion, the desire of the Central European countries to belong to NATO, and the pretty stubborn opposition of Russia's representatives, regardless of their background, against NATO expansion. [passage omitted]

We noticed certain nuances in Russia's stance, as formulated by the representatives of the presidency and the State Duma, some more normal positions, but unfortunately we also noted a return to some pretty tough stands, which we have thought long since gone, from the times before the fall of communism. I believe that we, who represented Romania, did our duty. We reminded the audience of our national will, as attested by the great majority of our people, who favor Romania's adherence to NATO. [passage omitted]

[AZI] You were talking about some tough positions. Who were their exponents?

[Roman] These tough positions were promoted by certain representatives of the Russian Army and by certain representatives of various political analysis institutes linked to the Russian presidency. They tried to prove that Russia needs time to get used to this idea, because unfortunately NATO is still perceived there as a military bloc. In this respect, quite welcome was the intervention of the U.S. representative, who proved that NATO is more of a political rather than military entity and unit, which has managed democratize itself, to create a French-German axis, to settle the known French-German historical dispute, to maintain U.S. involvement in Europe as a guarantee for world security, and to maintain prosperity in that part of the world. In this respect, our countries in Central Europe do not wish anything else but to regain a kind of position through which they can reach that level of development that we currently see in the civilized world, something that we have successively missed since 1945, the year when the Western world began its development and technological and information revolution, all of which was missed by us for the simple reason that we belonged to a backward bloc against our will.

[AZI] Your visit to Russia took place at a specific time, shortly after the meeting of the NATO candidate countries; shortly after the participation of Javier Solana,

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NATO secretary general, in the discussions with Yeltsin and Primakov; and shortly before Solana's visit to Bucharest. In this respect, what is the message sent to the participants in that meeting regarding Romania's adherence to NATO?

[Roman] The president of Russia's Political Center briefed us on the talks between NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and President Yeltsin and his advisers and assured us that these talks were even more fiery than those held by us at the conference. I believe there is a need for untiring regularity in Romania's policy in order to back our efforts to belong to the free, developed, and prosperous world. [passage omitted] I said there that we want to enter into a partnership with a democratic Russia. I hope that Russia will remain on this path of the democratic process and that the new bridges to be built with Russia—since we consider the old ones as shattered—should be solid and based on economic ties. We have interests there and they can have interests here, but without any kind of political preconditions—hence, the need for the politicians to support this dialogue, determination, and choice.

Romania: Bucharest Police Raid Kurd Headquarters

LD0904211696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The antiterrorist unit of the Bucharest police has carried out a raid on the headquarters of Kurds living in Romania. Tibor Bogdan reports:

[Bogdan] One of the Bucharest districts witnessed a thriller-like scene when a commando of Bucharest police antiterrorist units, wearing black balaclavas, raided the headquarters of the Kurds living in the Romanian capital. Members of the commando took up positions on the roof of the surrounding houses then descended by ropes into the buildings.

Earlier the Kurds issued a statement saying that they wish to transfer their headquarters from Germany to Romania. Not long ago they launched the publication of a Romanian-language newspaper of their own, called THE VOICE OF MESOPOTAMIA, and recently a meeting, which could pass as a congress, was held in the seaside town of Techirghiol with the participation of 83 of the movement's leaders.

The Romanian authorities are helpless in the face of the ever- increasing influx of Kurds into the country because they arrive as Turkish citizens and a visa is not necessary between Romania and Turkey.

During the raid of the antiterrorist unit a man suspected of drug smuggling was detained in the Bucharest headquarters of the Kurds and a large amount of paperwork was also seized. According to the leaders of the Romanian Kurds, Mustafa Hassan, the detained man, is of Turkish origin and the police picked him up from the street and took him into the building. He also said that the surprise police raid was carried out as a result of political pressure brought on by Turkey.

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Federal

FRY: Political Parties Comment on Treaty With FYROM

LD0904205396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2030 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Apr. 9 (TANJUG)—New Democracy (ND) said on Tuesday [9 April] that the Yugoslav-Macedonian treaty on normalizing relations was an "act of extreme importance for consolidating peace, strengthening stability in the region and developing good-neighborly relations."

The coalition partner to the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia said the accord would stimulate economic, cultural, scientific, ecological and other forms of cooperation.

ND stressed as important the part of the treaty pertaining to the protection of national rights of Serbs in Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and Macedonians in Serbia.

Thereby the final misunderstandings between the two peoples had been cleared, and problems would be solved "in keeping with the best civilizational achievements," said ND.

The non-parliamentary party of the League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia said the mutual recognition of Yugoslavia and Macedonia was an "expression of factual state and a natural flow of events created after the break-up of Yugoslavia."

It said the treaty was an important presupposition toward a more comprehensive link of peoples and states in the Balkans.

The opposition People's Party of Montenegro said Yugoslavia should have considered a number of facts before recognizing Macedonia in its present borders as it "opened space for Croatia to demand the same."

FRY: TANJUG Report Hails FRY-FYROM Treaty

LD0904182896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1716 GMT 9 Apr 96

[Report by diplomatic editor Zoran Jevdjevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 9 (TANJUG)—The signing of the agreement on the regulation of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the [Former Yugoslav] Republic of Macedonia in Belgrade on Monday leads to the lasting normalisation of the two countries' relations and the stabilisation of the overall situation in the Balkans and in Europe.

Yugoslavia continues this way to implement in its foreign policy its consistent and principled stand that all issues between Balkan states, and especially the questions which appeared after the forcible secession of some republics of the former Yugoslavia, must be settled by negotiations.

This means solutions have to be reached by peaceful means with the respect of all interested parties and without unilateral moves.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic told reporters after signing the agreement with his Macedonian counterpart Ljubomir Frckoski that relations between Belgrade and Skopje had been virtually normal from the outset of the Yugoslav crisis, and that this was only reaffirmed by the signing of the agreement.

Belgrade again showed that it is the central factor in the territory of the former Yugoslavia sincerely wishing to contribute to the settlement of contentious issues by peaceful means whenever that is possible and by maximum respect of the interests of others while remaining fully aware of its own interests.

The European Union [EU] has after several years of crisis also adopted a realistic stand concerning relations between the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

Respect for Yugoslavia's principled and consistent policy is growing, even in countries such as Germany, which cannot be said to have had a balanced stand towards events in this area.

It should be recalled in this context that the only demand of the EU Ministerial Council for the full normalistion of EU relations with Belgrade was the normalisation of relations between Yugoslavia and Macedonia.

The process of the promotion of relations of the group of countries headed by France and the F.R.Y. was looked upon with restraint by some European centers.

It can now be expected that objections will be dropped and that F.R.Y.'s diplomatic-political position will be fully stabilised as far as its European partners are concerned considering its increasingly respected and important role in the Balkans.

The model established in the Belgrade-Skopje relations best shows why there had been no full normalisation of relations with other states emerging from the former Yugoslavia. It also shows what remained to be done for this normalisation to take place to mutual and general benefit.

A mutually satisfactory agreement was reached with Macedonia which respects the basic interests regarding the F.R.Y.'s state and legal continuity of the former Yugoslavia.

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The agreement also provides for two outstanding issues to be subsequently resolved through negotiations until the full regulation of the relations of the two countries in all spheres of mutual interest.

There is absolutely no reason why this model cannot be applied to relations with the other states of the former Yugoslavia. If the situation does not develop this way Belgrade can certainly not be held to blame.

Hence, one should believe that other former Yugoslav republics will soon realise that it is in the general and in their own interest to find a way to fully normalise relations with Belgrade by recognising its legitiamte interests and respecting commitments undertaken during negotiations.

FRY: Economic Return to World Market Slower Than Expected

LD1004102296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1006 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 10 (TANJUG)—The return of Yugoslavia's economy to the world market following the suspension of U.N. sanctions is considerably more slow and difficult than expected and there are still no conditions for any essential production increases at home, it was heard at a session of the board of managers of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce in Belgrade on Tuesday [9 April].

Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce President Mihailo Milojevic said at the session that the Yugoslav and Serbian and Montenegrin Governments should 'model market behaviour for all, and not be centers of privileges.'

He said that 'Yugoslavia does not need primary issue of cash, where privileged persons became rich overnight, nor too much red tape' since the time of sanctions is past, when non-market activities were present.

Milojevic said the system of commercial banking and the Yugoslav National Bank should function along market criteria.

He assessed the most important task of the economy and state was to increase production, especially of export-oriented goods, in order to secure the biggest possible inflow of hard currency.

Yugoslav Minister Tomica Raicevic said the maintaining of a stable rate of exchange of the dinar, increase of production and exports, and decrease of taxes on companies were the most important tasks being tackled by the Yugoslav Government.

Raicevic said the normalization of relations with the International Monetary Fund and other institutions was in the focus of attention of the Yugoslav Government.

He said the federal parliament would next month discuss major system-related laws, including those on transformation of property, the tax system, on companies, and a draft law against monopoly.

FRY: PTT Introduces Standardized Phone Sets

96BA0203A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 96 p 16

[Article by Z. Mihic: "The National Telephone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beginning this month, every new telephone subscriber should receive at the time of installation from PTT [Post, Telephone, and Telegraph] "Srbija" a standard "national telephone," as it is called; its price will be included when the new subscriber number is issued. Under a contract with the PTT, the first lot of 25,000 certified and standardized phone sets, which will sell for about 98 German marks [DM] apiece, are already being manufactured at the "Pupin Terminali" Electronics Industry. If the competent Serbian Ministry of Transportation and Communications issues a decree soon to give this contract legal force, then the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] will get its first postal telephone, or the so-called national telephone, just like Germany, Italy, or France.

According to a study done recently in the Community of Yugoslav PTT Organizations, the flood of uncertified and substandard phone sets on the domestic market, and the interferences in operation of telephone traffic which they cause, made it necessary to introduce a standard telephone which must be installed as the "first telephone" whenever a new subscriber is connected.

Because the only telephone manufacturer in the country, "Pupin Terminali" Electronics Industry, has so far manufactured more than 1.7 million phone sets, it was logical for it to be the first and most serious candidate for the "national telephone" project in the FRY.

"This is a project for long-term cooperation with the PTT in which we have already invested about DM3 million to develop the domestic model. The tools for our model were made in Italy, the design was done by our specialists, and at the moment we are in the phase of completing the first series of 25,000 units," says Zoran Ilic, managing director of "Pupin Terminali." "The Community of PTT, then, did a study of the kind of telephone we need, we made the phone set, and after testing its quality the community issued a certification for its use. In its technical characteristics, this telephone is on a par with the quality of leading phone sets in

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the world and will be at least 10 percent cheaper than similar ones on the market today."

The true name of this telephone is "standardized phone set for the Yugoslav PTT," and it is only one extension of the increasingly close cooperation which has begun to develop between PTT "Srbija" and the domestic industry in the telecommunications sphere.

Last week, a contract was signed in ceremonies in the Serbian Chamber of Commerce between PTT "Srbija" and Electronics Industry Holding Corporation for delivery of DKTS-20 telephone offices with a capacity of 100 new connections per year. Because this office, which has already proven itself in last year's delivery of 50,000 new connections, is based on domestic technology, this contract might be considered historic in the development of the telecommunications industry in Serbia. Until five years ago, Electronics Industry of Zemun-Polje was excluded from the development plans of the Community of Yugoslav PTT concerning this subject matter.

Alone, But Without a Monopoly

When it comes to standardization of phone sets, we must realize that most phones from abroad which are available on the domestic market have not been adapted to the technical characteristics of domestic telephone traffic. The most frequent cause of interference is that the tone-pause ratio of the signal during dialing is different. For that reason, even good examples of foreign telephones function poorly in our network. At the same time, that telephone is treated in the system as an "end terminal" and through feedback has an impact on the load on other "elements" of the transportation network.

A few years ago, we were big "consumers" of PTT telephones from Germany, which could be bought for DM20 or DM30 in consignment stores selling foreign goods. Actually, these were discarded and repaired "national" telephones of the German PTT. Rich countries can allow themselves the luxury of changing the national models every three or four years For the present, there is only one model of the domestic version, but, according to Zoran Ilic, after the first deliveries are made they will soon begin to develop a second model, perhaps for business use.

The interest of the post office and the interest of the manufacturer are undoubtedly the same at this point. For the telephone factory itself, which during the sanctions and scarcity operated at 30 percent of its capacity, the "national telephone" can be a guarantee of long-term business and survival.

Asked whether this was indirectly a case of monopoly production, Zoran Ilic replied that they have nothing against other domestic manufacturers competing for this telephone, but they first must prove that they are really manufacturers (and not merely assemblers), that they can furnish large deliveries as a responsible trading partner, and can guarantee their quality. At this point, there is still no such competitor on the horizon.

[Box, p 16]

Three Tunes

The telephone's functions are as follows:

- pulse and tone frequency dialing;
- redialing the last number called;
- a memory holding 10 32-digit numbers;
- temporary microphone switch-off;
- pause programming;
- selection of the tune and volume of the ring (there are three tunes and four sound levels of the ring);
- signals showing the receiver has been raised;
- signal showing the pulse dialing mode.

Serbia

Serbia: Party Leader Says FRY in 'Grave Crisis'

LD0904161496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1416 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 9 Apr (TANJUG)—The Democratic Party of Serbia believes that relations between the federal state of Yugoslavia and its federal units—as well as relations between Serbia and Montenegro—are in a state of grave crisis, Vladan Batic, deputy head of the party's club of deputies, said today.

Speaking at a news conference in the Serbian parliament, Batic said that the crisis could be defused by passing new federal and republican constitutions and holding a referendum at which citizens would decide whether they wish to live together and—if so—in what kind of community. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Article on Possible Republican Government Reshuffle

AU1004093196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 96 p 19

[Report by B. Cani: "'Cosmetics' on a (Somewhat) Larger Scale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic has announced, the preparations for the reconstruction of the Republican Government are entering

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into their final stage. Gorica Gajovic, chief of the club of deputies of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] in the Serbian Assembly and the party secretary general, claims that there will be "no spectacular changes" and says that they (the SPS) judge the work of both governments, especially the republican, "to be positive." At the federal level, according to Gajovic, the posts of vice presidents and ministers will be separated, while, at the republican level, some ministries will be abolished while new ministries will be formed. Our sources, however, claim that these changes at the republican level will not be merely cosmetic.

For the time being, it is quite certain that Slobodan Unkovic, who is to become the ambassador to China, will vacate two posts (of vice president and minister). Apart from Unkovic, it appears that another post of the vice president will "open." Namely, it is rumored that the days of Slobodan Babic are numbered because he is considered "Jovic's cadre" from Kragujevac.

Regarding the ministerial posts, Ivko Djonovic is expected to depart because of his argument with [National Bank] Governor Dragoslav Avramovic over the possibility of the money issue (a story of two days ago); and Radovan Pankov, in charge of the relations with the Serbs outside Serbia; Jovan Radic, minister of labor, veterans, and social welfare; and Finance Minister Dusan Vlatkovic have also been mentioned. Judging by everything, Health Minister Leposava Milicevic will also bid farewell to her post. It is uncertain what will happen to the rest of the "JUL [Yugoslav Left] ministers," Dragan Kostic and Andrija Milosavljevic. There are two conflicting stories regarding JUL: That it will strengthen its position in the government even further and that all cadres of this movement will be removed.

Regarding the position of the coalition partner in the government, our sources claim that the position of New Democracy will remain unaltered, which means that they will continue to have four representatives in the government.

Serbia: Muslim Soldiers Depart Refugee Camp for Bosnia

LD1004082496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0747 GMT 10 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Uzice, 10 Apr (TANJUG)—A group of 211 Muslim soldiers left the Branesko Polje refugee reception center near Uzice [in Serbia] for Tuzla this morning. They had escaped to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the Zepa area [eastern Bosnia] in August 1995.

Last week the reception center was visited by a delegation from the Muslim-Croat Federation and 211 out of 276 Muslims decided to return to Tuzla and Sarajevo.

The remaining 65 Muslim soldiers are waiting for permits to leave for Finland and Denmark.

Serbia: Communist Leader Says FRY Threatened by Separatism

LD0804215196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2004 GMT 8 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Novi Sad, 8 Apr (TANJUG)—Goran Latinovic, the chairman of the republican committee of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia [savez komunista - pokret za jugoslaviju, SK-PJ] in Serbia, said in Novi Sad this evening that separatist forces and aspirations currently posed the greatest threat to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Speaking at the party's roundtable on the political and economic situation in the country, he drew attention to the increasingly aggressive behavior of "a section of the Montenegrin authorities and a number of opposition parties in Serbia and Montenegro."

We expect the federal government to resolve the problem of separatism as soon as possible, otherwise we could share the fate of former Yugoslavia, Latinovic warned. [passage omitted]

Latinovic said that international organizations and institutions must be prevented from getting involved in the resolution of problems in Kosovo-Metohija.

Commenting on the forthcoming federal elections, Latinovic said he hoped the left would find a common interest and fight the elections united.

He said that our opposition was a "neurotic factor" and that political leaders of the right had destroyed the political idea and role of the opposition as a monitor of government's work.

"The opposition behaves in an aggressive manner fit for the street, and that is not the way to conduct long-term policy," Latinovic said.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Addresses Albanian PD Convention in Tirana

AU0904092396 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, addressed Thursday

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in Tirana the third convention of the ruling party in Albania, President Berisha's Democratic Party (PD). Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said he was delighted to be able to address the PD meeting on behalf of the Republic of Kosova, of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) and other political and governmental institutions of Kosova. Under President Sali Berisha's leadership and the administration of the Democratic Party (PD), Albania has become a modern, open and democratic country, the Kosova President said, adding: "Albania has at length walked out of self-oblivion". The PD has assumed "an Albanian and European profile", Dr. Rugova said, commending the party for its commitment to tolerance, civic liberties, market-economy policies, and having created a "new pragmatic administration, a new democratic ethics".

President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova noted the PD and the LDK - as well as other political forces in Albania, Kosova and other ethnic Albanian territories - have established a spirit of cooperation after almost a century. "This spirit has been relayed in the governmental institutions in Albania and Kosova alike", Dr. Rugova stressed, adding that such a cooperation benefits the Albanian nation in general, but also peace and stability in the region. The people of Kosova have been facing hard times, President Rugova of Kosova said, noting that it is owing to their determination and sacrifices that they have survived and averted a conflict break-out. "An independent and neutral Kosova, which is the political will of the people expressed in the referendum and the parliamentary and presidential elections, is the best solution for Kosova", Dr. Ibrahim Rugova pointed out, reaffirming the need for an interim international civil administration in Kosova to facilitate a negotiated settlement to the Kosova issue. President of the Republic of Kosova said the continued support of the PD and other political forces of Albania has been of critical importance for Kosova, voicing the hope that will be further invigorated.

"I avail myself of the opportunity to express my appreciation to innumerable European parties, the United States of America, the European Union, and other UN member countries for their support to the Kosova issue", Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said, calling on the international community to "reward the non-violent resistance of the people of Kosova and its sacrifices for freedom, self-determination, independence and democracy, as well as its contribution to on-spreading of conflict."

Meanwhile, Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, also participating in the PD convention, said Thursday the "national dimension of the Albanian policy in the Balkans is a guarantee for the prosperity of our nation". Kosova is still under Serbian] occupation, Dr. Bukoshi said, but heading towards its freedom, "which has only one meaning: full independence".

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